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Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to investigate the role of information and career concerns
in organizations. To that end, I submit three papers, each of which addresses a
unique aspect of a firm’s organizational problem. In the first chapter I investigate
the incentives of a firm to reveal strategic information to the market in order to
make its leader more conservative as regards early decisions. The firm may do
so to achieve coordination between different levels of the firm’s hierarchy or to
improve adaptation to the firm’s environment. I give conditions on employees’ career
concerns that make the firm voluntarily disclose information concerning its strategic
decisions. In chapter 2 I ask why rational voters would knowingly re-elect a politician
who has expropriated public funds. In this model, the presence of non-strategic
(‘impressionable’) voters means that even welfare-minded politicians occasionally
raid the public purse in order to increase their chances of re-election. Being aware
of this dynamic, rational voters opt to reward politicians whose misbehavior is solely
due to career concerns. Chapter 3 changes tack somewhat to analyze the optimal
decision-making protocol for a committee when one member of the committee is
overconfident. I show that overconfidence leads an uninformed committee member
to respond to his private information, which causes a better-informed member to
stop using her private information. This leads to a loss of efficiency under majority
rule, and changes the optimal voting rule for the committee to unanimity.
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Introduction
In this thesis I set out to address some questions surrounding the role of information
and career concerns in organizations.
In chapter 1 I ask when a firm would discourage its leader from changing firm
strategy when his information changes. Firms that care about both adaptation and
coordination might choose to make leaders more conservative as a way to make the
leader’s final decision more predictable for followers. This is especially useful for
the firm if followers have strong reputation concerns that cause them to inefficiently
disregard public information provided by the leader. I compare two different types
of leader conservatism—strategic conservatism that arises from reputation concerns
and non-strategic conservatism—and provide some empirical predictions for how
one might distinguish between reputation concerns and rote conservatism.
In chapter 2 I present a two-period political agency model with re-election. There
are two parts: a benchmark with only rational voting and an extension with cam-
paign spending. I find that, if electoral results are sensitive to campaign activity,
good politicians (those who wish to maximize voter welfare) can be induced to be-
have corruptly. Rational voters realize this, and are willing to forgive corruption in
politicians they believe to be good. A preliminary welfare analysis shows that, in
some instances, voters may prefer to leave the option of campaign spending open
for the information it provides, and also may prefer that good types act corruptly
in the interest of re-election.
Chapter 3 analyzes a 3-person committee that must decide between two candidate
policies. Two members receive an informative signal about the most appropriate
policy. The third member is uninformed, but suffers from overconfidence that leads
him to think his noisy signal is informative. When he votes according to his signal,
adding noise to the outcome, the lesser-informed of the other two agents strategically
9
ignores her signal under majority rule, effectively trading bad information for good.
Because of this behavior, majority rule ceases to be the preferred voting rule. Social
welfare is instead maximized by selecting a voting rule that requires unanimity, and
in some cases requires unanimity for the a priori more likely policy. This is never the
case in the absence of overconfidence. Thus, bias in one member’s self-assessment
leads to a reversal of preferences regarding the constitutional voting rule.
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Chapter 1
Career Concerns and the Corporate Hierarchy
1.1 Introduction
This paper asks when a firm would reduce its leader’s incentive to adapt firm strat-
egy in response to new information. I consider an environment where information
arrives in stages and is dispersed among individual agents, and a firm that cares
about both coordination between agents and adaptation to the firm’s environment.
Coordination can be easily achieved by designating a single person the leader and
instructing other agents (the followers) to coordinate on his ‘mission statement’, or
initial strategic decision. However, if incoming information prompts the leader to
change strategy, any actions followers have taken in support of the initial decision
will be worthless. This undermines the followers’ incentives to coordinate with the
leader, particularly when their own private information disagrees with the mission
statement.
The potential loss from the leader’s commitment problem is compounded by
reputation concerns amongst the followers, which motivate them to contradict the
mission statement too often. The reason this is attractive to followers is that the
leader may ultimately prove them right by changing directions, which is good news
about their ability. This points to a simple means of making the leader more effective
at coordination: reduce his responsiveness to new information.
I capture the basic problem for the firm in a simple model with two agents, a
leader and a follower, in which actions are taken over three periods. In the first stage,
the leader observes an initial signal of the firm’s environment, which he relays to the
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follower in the form of a mission statement. Next, the follower must decide whether
to hew to the leader’s initial projection or to take a different action altogether. She
also receives information about the state of nature and may conclude that the leader
is likely to change his mind, in which case following the mission statement is unwise.
Finally, the leader receives a second signal which fully reveals the state of the world.
Based on this knowledge, he may opt to reverse his initial decision in order to match
the true state. The firm’s decision is whether to take actions that make the leader
less likely to change his mind in the final period. That is, whether to engender
‘conservatism’ in the leader.
I find that when the leader is inclined to favor adaptation over coordination, firms
which care sufficiently about coordination want their leaders to be conservative. On
the other hand, when the leader is inclined to favor coordination over adaptation,
conservative leaders are favored by firms that care sufficiently about adaptation.
Importantly, neither case requires significant disagreement between the leader and
the firm on priorities regarding adaptation and coordination.1
I analyze two substitutable types of conservatism—strategic and non-strategic—
and ask when such conservatism is beneficial for the firm. Strategic conservatism
arises from reputation concerns, and is activated by the firm disclosing information
to the labor market that reveals something about the leader’s talent. Revealing the
leader’s mission statement makes it reputationally costly for the leader to reverse
himself, since the mission statement is based on his private information. If more
able leaders have better private information, the market for leaders will use evidence
of reversals in forming judgments about a leader’s talent.
Non-strategic conservatism does not depend on the incentives facing the leader,
but instead relies on a personality type (like overconfidence) or workload (overload-
ing the leader’s portfolio) to achieve the same end. Overconfident leaders are more
apt to simply think they got it right to begin with; overworked leaders may not have
time to reconsider early decisions before they become irreversible.
Both methods have been proposed in the literature, however to my knowledge
no work has yet considered how the necessary behavioral assumptions operate when
applied to the organization as a whole. The firm’s choice to manipulate the leader
depends on how his incentives interact with those of other agents within the firm.
1When I speak of ‘the firm’, I have in mind the board of directors or some other group of
stakeholders who can influence firm policy on strategic disclosure and hiring practices.
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1.2 Related Literature
The most closely related paper is Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2011, here-
after BBV). BBV examines the benefit of hiring an overconfident leader when co-
ordination and adaptation matter. Overconfidence remedies the time-consistency
problem from new information tempting leaders to revise their initial decisions in
a way that followers dislike. The structure of this model borrows heavily from the
BBV setup; they too feature a two-level hierarchy whose agents receive a sequence
of signals and act according to information available at the time. Whereas they
consider only overconfidence, I also consider the effects of reputation concerns.
There is a substantial literature on inefficiency due to agents’ interest in manip-
ulating perceptions of their ability, starting with Fama (1980), Lazear and Rosen
(1982) and Holmström (1999—original 1982). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ot-
taviani and Sørensen (2000) demonstrate that agents mimic the behavior of others
for reputational reasons. In Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989), Boot (1992),
Zweibel (1995) and Prendergast and Stole (1996), decision-makers act either too
conservatively or too aggressively, depending on which gives a better impression
of their talent. Leaver (2009) shows that regulators are overly lenient in order to
prevent unfavorable information being revealed to the market.
I follow Prendergast and Stole (1996) in asserting that agents at different points
in their careers may have opposite incentives regarding conformism, and propose
that this may affect coordination within a firm. Levy (2004) demonstrates that,
rather than herding on public information, agents may be too eager to contradict
it (anti-herding). This is more likely true early in an individual’s career. I find
that conservative leadership reduces followers’ incentive to anti-herd, and may even
result in herding on the mission statement. My results for the leader’s behavior are
comparable to those of Ferreira and Rezende (2007), which considers how reputation
concerns help a leader commit to a particular project, which in their case increases
a follower’s willingness to invest in it.
In addition, a number of papers highlight the role of leaders’ personal attributes.2
The most relevant are those characteristics that address a commitment problem,
such as a managerial bias toward particular activities. Such biases imply commit-
ment to implement innovations in those areas, which gives workers incentives to put
effort into the manager’s pet projects (see Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Hart and
2For a discussion of why an organization would want to have ‘leaders’ at all, see Komai, Stegeman
and Hermalin (2007).
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Holmström, 2002; and Van den Steen, 2005). Another branch of this literature is
explicitly concerned with overconfidence.3 Englmaier (2004) finds that firms want
to delegate cost-cutting R&D decisions to overconfident managers. This is similar
to my result that firms may prefer overconfident leaders. Blanes i Vidal and Möller
(2007) show how overconfidence can be helpful in a situation similar to that of Fer-
reira and Rezende (2007). However, in their case overconfidence is beneficial because
it increases responsiveness to information; in my case, overconfidence helps because
it decreases responsiveness to information.
Outline
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1.3 introduces the model and section 1.4
discusses some relevant benchmark results. Section 1.5 analyzes strategic conser-
vatism that arises from publishing the leader’s mission statement, and shows when
that is favorable for the firm. Section 1.6 covers non-strategic leader conservatism
and then applies the same behavioral assumptions to the follower. Section 1.7 dis-
cusses empirical predictions and section 1.8 concludes. All proofs are contained in
the appendix.
1.3 Model
I consider a firm comprised of two agents, a leader L (he) and a follower F (she).
The firm operates in an environment characterized by a state w ∈ {A,B}. Ex ante
the two states are equally likely. Each player has private information about the state
of the world. In addition there is an evaluator E, which serves as a proxy for the
external labor market. E’s only action is to form a belief about the leader’s ability
to correctly perceive the state of the world. The game proceeds as follows:
Period 1 : The leader observes a private signal s1 ∈ {A,B} and takes an initial
action a1 ∈ {A,B}. The leader’s accuracy is Pr (s1 = w | w) = t, where t is known
only to the leader but it is common knowledge that t comes from the distribution
H with support on
[
1
2 , 1
]
. a1 is interpreted as the ‘mission statement’, and is best
understood as the direction in which the leader thinks the firm should go.4 Action
a1 is always observable by the follower, but the firm can choose to publicize the
3For empirical evidence of overconfidence in leadership, see Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008)
and Camerer and Lovallo (1999).
4This could be, for example, entering a new market or undertaking a merger.
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mission statement, in which case the market, in the form of the evaluator E, will
also observe the leader’s initial choice. I assume that if the firm’s policy is to disclose
a1, then the same action is observed by both F and E. That is, the leader cannot
send contradictory signals to different parties.5
Period 2 : The follower observes a1 and receives a private signal sF ∈ {A,B}.
Similar to the leader, Pr (sF = w | w) = p, where p is the follower’s private informa-
tion. It is common knowledge that p is drawn from the distribution G with support
on
[
1
2 , 1
]
. The signals s1 and sF are conditionally independent. Based on a1 and sF ,
the follower chooses her action aF ∈ {A,B}.
Period 3 : Finally the leader learns the true state of the world w. After seeing aF
and w, the leader takes a final action a2 ∈ {A,B}.
For the duration, consider the case of s1 = A. This is without loss of gener-
ality due to the prior Pr (w = A) = 12 . Results are symmetric for the alternative
assumption s1 = B.
Payoffs
The firm’s profit has two components: adaptation to the state of the world and coor-
dination between the two players. The relative importance of these two components
is captured by a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] such that the firm’s total payoff is
V = γI + (1− γ) IF
where I is an indicator that takes value 1 if a2 = w (adaptation) and IF is another
indicator that takes value 1 if aF = a2 (coordination). I assume that the leader
cares about both adaptation and coordination (not necessarily in the same way as
the firm),6 but that the follower simply cares about matching the leader’s action at
the end of play (i.e. coordinating with the leader).
In addition, it may be the case that both the follower and the leader care about
their reputations. That is, they care what the prevailing estimate of their ‘type’
p or t is. The follower cares about her reputation within the firm, so the leader’s
assessment of the follower’s type is relevant. This task does not affect the leader’s
5Assuming to the contrary that contradictory messages are possible would not change anything,
as contradictory messages would never be sent in equilibrium.
6For example, if coordination mostly affects short-term benefits, the firm may have a longer time
horizon that puts greater weight on adaptation.
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payoff directly, but I assume the leader tries his best to guess the follower’s type.
The leader, on the other hand, cares about his reputation in the external market,
or E’s belief about his type. The leader’s utility is then
UL (a1, a2; aF , w) = γLI +
(
1− γL
)
IF + λτ
where τ is E’s posterior estimate of t given the actions observed. That is, τ =
E [t | a1, aF , a2] if the mission statement is published and τ = E [t | aF , a2] if not.
Utility for the follower is given by
UF (aF ; a1, a2, w) = IF + µpi
where pi is L’s updated belief about F ’s type p having observed her action and the
true state of the world, so that pi = E [p | a1, aF , w].
Strategies
The leader’s strategy is to pick a1 in period 1 (a function ζ : s1 → {A,B}), and to
pick a2 in period 3 (a function ρ : (a1, aF , w) → {A,B}). Likewise, the follower’s
strategy is to pick aF , that is, a function σ : (a1, sF , p)→ {A,B}.7
E conjectures ρ and σ, observes (a1, aF , a2) and forms beliefs τ about the leader’s
type using Bayes’ rule wherever possible. L conjectures σ, observes (a1, aF , w) and
forms beliefs pi about the follower’s type, again using Bayes’ rule where possible.
With regard to the decision component of the player’s payoffs, it is immediately
verifiable in period 3 whether the follower correctly anticipated the leader’s action,
but I assume that at the time the leader’s ability is evaluated, the state of the world
is not yet verifiable. This captures the fact that leaders often have to take actions
which have consequences in the long run, but that their reputations matter in the
short run.8 So I explicitly assume that the firm can contract on the state of the world
with the leader, but that the leader’s reputation concerns matter in the interim, as
he may avail himself of an outside option before the results of his actions are fully
realized.
In short, the leader and follower differ in three ways:
7Technically, ζ : {A,B} × [ 12 , 1] → {A,B}, ρ : {A,B}3 → {A,B}, and σ : {A,B}2 × [ 12 , 1] →{A,B}.
8This is the same assumption made in Ferreira and Rezende (2007).
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1. Order of moves: The leader is responsible for the ultimate decision taken, and
also gets to provide an indication at the beginning of how he is likely to choose.
The follower has to take an action in between, before all the information is in,
and her decision may be rendered null by the leader.
2. Decision component of payoff: The leader’s bonus depends on both adaptation
and coordination; the follower’s bonus is for coordination only (i.e. by coming
up with an idea to suit the firm’s new direction, getting a qualification that is
only useful if the firm undertakes a specific project...).
3. Reputation locus: Leaders care more about their reputation outside the firm
(perhaps because of legacy interests or because headhunters approach them
with opportunities), whereas followers care more about their reputation inside
the firm (perhaps they are interested in promotion within the firm or get most
of their job offers through current and former colleagues).
1 is crucial to my results whereas 2 and 3 are not, provided µ is large enough. If
the order of play or information structure were different, this would be a different
game. On the other hand, nothing would change if the follower also cared about
the leader’s final action matching the state of the world as long as her reputation
concerns are strong enough. Furthermore, if the follower cared about her reputation
outside the firm rather than inside her incentives would be somewhat different (since
E never knows the true state of the world), but Proposition 2 of Levy (2004) predicts
qualitatively similar results.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at times subject to refine-
ment to rule out unreasonable equilibria. The refinement I consider is Banks and
Sobel’s (1987) Divinity Criterion, which requires out-of-equilibrium beliefs to place
relatively more weight on types that gain more from deviating from a proposed
equilibrium. Occasionally D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987) is also used to ensure
uniqueness of pooling equilibria.9
1.4 Benchmark
There are two relevant benchmarks for this model. The first benchmark is the case of
no reputation concerns, in which players do not act strategically to affect perceptions
9D1 fixes an equilibrium outcome and then eliminates beliefs that put positive probability on a
defection by type t if whenever t weakly prefers to defect, there is another type t′ that strictly
prefers to defect.
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of their talent. In this case, λ = µ = 0. In the second benchmark the follower has
career concerns (µ > 0), and so departs from the non-strategic benchmark in order
to affect her reputation within the firm. I first consider the effect of follower career
concerns and then in section 1.5 discuss how reputation concerns for the leader can
be useful in curtailing the follower’s inefficient signaling behavior.
1.4.1 No reputation concerns
First consider the benchmark case in which neither player has reputation concerns
(λ = µ = 0). Recall the assumption that s1 = A. In period 1, L truthfully reveals
his signal to F , since he has no reason not to. So a1 = A. Using backwards
induction, the action taken by the leader in period 3, once the follower’s action
has been taken, depends on the relative importance of adaptation and coordination.
Take the example of aF = A. The leader’s choice between actions A and B boils
down to comparing
γLPr (w = A | w) +
(
1− γL
)
· 1 R γL (1− Pr (w = A | w)) +
(
1− γL
)
· 0
which simplifies to
Pr (w = A | w) R 1− 12γL .
Since Pr (w = A | w) ∈ {0, 1}, the leader will match the true state of the world if
γL ≥ 12 and will match the follower if γL < 12 . The latter case is somewhat difficult
to describe as ‘leadership’ since the leader will ultimately choose whichever action
the follower takes. In this case, the leader is more like an advisor who provides early
information to the follower but ultimately makes good on whatever the follower
decides.
Knowing this, F compares her expected payoff from taking action A or B. Since
she only cares about matching the leader, the relevant comparison is
Pr (a2 = A | η) R Pr (a2 = B | η)
where η ≡ (a1, sF , p) is the information available to the follower in period 2. In
equilibrium, the follower’s strategy σˆ is characterized by a cutoff (a1, sˆF , pˆ). The
follower chooses aF = A if Pr (a2 = A | a1, sF , p, ζ) ≥ Pr (a2 = A | a1, sˆF , pˆ, ζ) and
chooses aF = B otherwise.10 In this case, since ζˆ (s1) = s1 = A, the comparison is
10This is Lemma 1 of Levy (2004).
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Pr (a2 = A | A, sF , p) ≥ Pr (a2 = A | A, sˆF , pˆ). Since this is always the case, from
here onwards I will drop the argument a1 from the follower’s cutoff strategy.
For values of γL greater than or equal to 12 , the leader will match the true state
of the world. This implies the follower should take action A if and only if
Pr (w = A | η)
Pr (w = B | η) ≥ 1. (1.1)
If γL < 12 , the follower knows that the leader will match her action, so she is
indifferent between her two actions choices. This indifference admits a number of
tie-breaking rules, including one which selects the most likely state of the world
given η. This is the most efficient equilibrium. Let t¯ ≡ E [t].
Proposition 1. When λ = µ = 0 and γL ≥ 12 , the unique equilibrium involves
a1 = s1, a2 = w, and σˆ =
(
B, t¯
)
. When γL < 12 , there exists an equilibrium in
which a1 = s1, a2 = aF , and σˆ =
(
B, t¯
)
.
When the leader cares more about adaptation, his final decision reflects the true
state of the world, but when he cares more about coordination, his final decision is
to match the follower. Knowing this, the follower makes her best guess about the
true state of the world given her information. In the first instance this is a strict
best response, whereas in the second it is by assumption.
The firm’s payoff
The firm’s payoff in this case is
Vˆ =

γ + (1− γ)
(´ t¯
1
2
t¯g (s) ds+
´ 1
t¯
sg (s) ds
)
γL ≥ 12
γ
(´ t¯
1
2
t¯g (s) ds+
´ 1
t¯
sg (s) ds
)
+ (1− γ) γL < 12 .
When γL ≥ 12 , the leader matches the true state, so the firm is assured its
adaptation payoff γ. Coordination only happens when the follower also chooses the
correct state, which happens either when the mission statement is correct and is
followed or when the follower is talented enough to follow her own signal and that
signal is correct. Conversely, when γL < 12 , coordination is assured, but the firm
only gets the adaptation payoff if the follower chooses the correct state in period
2.
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Unsurprisingly, this payoff is increasing in t¯. The firm would like its leader to
be high ability in expectation, so that the follower can confidently follow his lead.
This motivates the follower’s interest in having a good reputation within the firm. If
leaders are promoted from within the firm from the ranks of followers, then followers
who are thought to have higher ability are more likely to be promoted.11 It also
motivates the leader’s interest in having a good reputation outside the firm in section
1.5. If all firms want leaders of high ability, then having a reputation for talent is
likely to generate better outside offers.
1.4.2 Follower reputation concerns and anti-herding
Suppose now that the follower cares about the leader’s assessment of her ability
(µ > 0). In this case, Levy (2004) shows that ‘anti-herding’ arises, in which the
follower contradicts prior information too often relative to the benchmark.
Let the follower’s reputation function be denoted pi (aF ;w, σ). Her reputation
also depends on the mission statement a1, but having established that a1 is always
A I will omit it from the notation from the outset. The value pi (aF ;w, σ) is the
leader’s expectation of F ’s type after observing her action and the true state of the
world, having conjectured some strategy σ. For example, by Bayes’ rule,
pi (a; a, σ) =
ˆ 1
1
2
s
(sPr (σ (sF , p) = sF ) + (1− s) Pr (σ (sF , p) 6= sF )) g (s)´ 1
1
2
(sPr (σ (sF , p) = sF ) + (1− s) Pr (σ (sF , p) 6= sF )) g (s) ds
ds
The equilibrium in this case again involves a cutoff strategy σ′ = (s′F , p′), where
aF = A if and only if Pr (w = A | sF , p) ≥ Pr (w = A | s′F , p′). Knowing that with
λ = 0 the leader acts as in section 1.4.1, the follower’s condition for choosing aF = A,
equation (1.1), becomes12
Pr (w = A | η)
Pr (w = B | η) ≥

1+µ[pi(B;B,σ′)−pi(A;B,σ′)]
1+µ[pi(A;A,σ′)−pi(B;A,σ′)] γ
L ≥ 12
pi(B;B,σ′′)−pi(A;B,σ′′)
pi(A;A,σ′′)−pi(B;A,σ′′) γ
L < 12
(1.2)
Looking at (1.2), Levy (2004) shows that there cannot be an equilibrium in which
s′F = A, so that in equilibrium only a follower with sF = B would ever contradict
the leader. This follows from the monotone likelihood ratio property. Furthermore,
11Note that this implicitly assumes that the firm cannot commit to promoting followers based on
any other criteria (like in-job performance).
12Details for the follower’s problem in all cases are given in the appendix.
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the right hand side of (1.2) increases with p′, whereas the left hand side decreases
with p′, giving a unique cutoff with s′F = B and p′ < t¯.
Proposition 2. When λ = 0, µ > 0, and γL ≥ 12 , there exists a unique equilibrium
in which a1 = s1, a2 = s2, and σ′ = (B, p′), where p′ < t¯. p′ decreases in µ. If
γL < 12 , there exists a unique equilibrium with a1 = s1,a2 = aF and σ
′′ = (B, p′′).
For all µ ≥ 0, p′′ < p′.
This is the ‘anti-herding’—a follower of type p ∈
[
p′, t¯
]
(or p ∈
[
p′′, t¯
]
) chooses
A in the absence of career concerns. But because taking action B is a signal of
confidence in her ability, when she cares about her reputation she will excessively
contradict the mission statement. The case of γL < 12 , in which the follower needn’t
worry about matching the leader because the leader will match her, is equivalent
to the case of µ→∞, in which decision concerns become vanishingly unimportant
relative to reputation concerns.
The firm’s payoff
The firm’s payoff becomes
V ′ =

γ + (1− γ)
(´ p′
1
2
t¯g (s) ds+
´ 1
p′ sg (s) ds
)
γL ≥ 12
γ
(´ p′′
1
2
t¯g (s) ds+
´ 1
p′′ sg (s) ds
)
+ (1− γ) γL < 12
(1.3)
which, compared to (1.4.1) represents a loss of
Vˆ − V ′ =
(1− γ)
´ t¯
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds γL ≥ 12
γ
´ t¯
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds γL < 12 .
This loss decreases in p′ (up to a point), indicating that one way for the firm to
address the anti-herding problem would be to decrease µ, if possible. This would in-
volve a higher bonus for matching the leader’s action.13 Depending on the follower’s
intrinsic career concerns, this may be prohibitively expensive (although the trade-off
involved in incentive pay is not something I model here). Therefore I take µ as given
and consider an alternative remedy: publishing the leader’s mission statement.
13However this is only effective if γL ≥ 12 .
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1.5 Publishing the Mission Statement
Now the firm considers publishing the leader’s mission statement, so that the outside
market will know whether or not the leader changes his mind from period 1 to
period 3. If λ > 0, this has the effect of making the leader less willing to revise his
initial decision in the face of new information. In this model, reputation concerns
serve the same purpose as in Ferreira and Rezende (2007). In both cases, the
leader’s reluctance to change his mind makes his final action more predictable for
the follower.
Again, proceed by backwards induction.
1.5.1 The leader’s problem
Consider now the case of λ > 0, so the leader has active reputation concerns. The
evaluator is concerned with distinguishing two ‘types’ of leader: s1 = w and s1 6= w.
That is, a leader who was initially correct or who was initially incorrect. Bayes’
rule implies that E [t | s1 = w] ≡ τ > E [t | s1 6= w] ≡ τ . Keep in mind that by
assumption s1 = A, so that if w = A it means the leader was initially correct.
Recall that the evaluator never learns the true state of the world. But because
the agents’ strategies are responsive to their information, their actions provide in-
formation to E on the true state of the world, and therefore on how likely it is the
leader was initially correct. If the mission statement is not published, the evaluator
has four possible observations (aF , a2): (A,A), (B,A), (A,B), and (B,B). If the
mission statement is published, he knows (a1, aF , a2).14 Using conjectures about
the follower’s and the leader’s strategies, E forms a belief about the true state of
the world based on the actions observed, and evaluates the leader based on those
beliefs.
Let the evaluator’s belief about w be r (aF , a2) ≡ Pr (w = A | aF , a2, σ, ρ), where
σ and ρ are E’s conjectures of the players’ strategies. The leader’s strategy takes
the form ρ (aF , w) = Pr (a2 = A | aF , w), and σ is a cutoff (sF , p) for the follower.
When the action pair (aF , a2) occurs on the equilibrium path, r (aF , a2) must be
derived from Bayes’ rule. By way of example, if the mission statement is published
14Unless necessary for clarity, I will suppress the a1 argument for concision.
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and s∗F = B,
r (A,A) =
t¯ρ (A,A)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
t¯ρ (A,A)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
+
(
1− t¯
)
ρ (A,B)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
]
The numerator is the probability of observing the action pair (A,A) following a
mission statement of A given that the true state of the world is indeed A. The prob-
ability of a correct mission statement is t¯, the probability the follower also chooses
A is
´ p∗
1
2
g (s) ds+
´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds with the first term representing the probability of a
type who never contradicts the mission statement, and the second term the proba-
bility of a high type getting a correct signal. ρ (A,A) is the probability of the final
action a2 = A when A is the true state and the follower also chose A. Similarly for
the denominator.
The remaining values of r (aF , a2) can be found in the appendix.
The two choices available to the firm are: publish the mission statement or do
not publish.
1.5.1.1 Not publish
If the mission statement is not published, then E forms beliefs only based on F ’s
action aF and L’s final action a2. Not being able to observe whether or not L
changed his mind between his initial observation and his final choice means that
equilibrium behavior is unchanged from the case in section 1.4.
Lemma 1. If a1 is not revealed to E, then in any equilibrium that satisfies Banks
and Sobel’s Divinity Criterion, a2 = w if γL ≥ 12 and a2 = aF if γL < 12 .
The intuition behind this is that when the mission statement is not published,
there is no evidence of policy reversals. So the only reason for a leader not to take
his preferred action in period 3 is that the evaluator assigns a bad reputation to
that action, thinking it likely comes from an incorrect leader. But once aF and w
are realized, both types s1 6= w and s1 = w face exactly the same payoffs, so such
beliefs are unreasonable and cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Given this behavior by the leader, the follower also acts as she does in the bench-
mark. The firm’s payoff therefore remains the same as in the benchmark scenario.
If, however, the firm chooses to publish L’s mission statement, E can see whether
23
or not the leader changes his mind, and this substantively changes the leader’s
problem.
1.5.1.2 Publish
Now let E observe the leader’s mission statement. There are four histories (aF , w)
at which the leader must make his choice: (A,A), (B,A), (A,B), and (B,B).
In period 3, the leader compares the payoff of taking action A versus action B.
Let4τ ≡ τ−τ . Given aF and w, the leader’s comparison is laid out in the following
table
(aF , w) UL (A | aF , w) UL (B | aF , w)
(A,A) 1 + λr (A,A)4τ R λr (A,B)4τ
(A,B) 1− γL + λr (A,A)4τ R γL + λr (A,B)4τ
(B,A) γL + λr (B,A)4τ R 1− γL + λr (B,B)4τ
(B,B) λr (B,A)4τ R 1 + λr (B,B)4τ
(1.4)
The next lemma establishes that a leader who was initially correct has no reason
to reverse himself if the follower agrees with him.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium which satisfies the Divinity Criterion, ρ (A,A) =
1.
That is, if both adaptation and coordination concerns favor sticking with the
initial assessment, then the leader does so for sure. This is an intuitive result, as
reversing his initial decision is a signal that he was incorrect, which is bad news
about his ability. He would never take a decision which is both objectively and
strategically bad. How the other types of leader behave depends on the values of
λ and γL. This behavior is covered by the next proposition. When γL < 12 , the
equilibrium may not be unique for some values of λ, so I provide the results which
give a lower bound on the benefit of publishing the mission statement for the firm
(details are in the appendix).
Proposition 3. When the mission statement is published, a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in period 3 exists. When γL ≥ 12 the equilibrium is unique. Given
σ∗ = (B, p∗), ρ∗ (aF , w) takes the following form for the leader’s possible histories:
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1. γL ≥ 12
ρ∗ (A,A) = 1
ρ∗ (B,A) = 1
ρ∗ (A,B) =

0 λ ≤ 2γL−14τ
ρ ∈ (0, 1) 2γL−14τ < λ < 2γ
L−1
rp(A,A)4τ
1 otherwise
ρ∗ (B,B) =

0 λ ≤ 14τ
ρ ∈ (0, 1) 14τ < λ < 1rp(B,A)4τ
1 otherwise
2. γL < 12
ρ∗ (A,A) = 1
ρ∗ (B,A) =
0 λ ≤
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ
1 otherwise
ρ∗ (A,B) = 1
ρ∗ (B,B) =

0 λ ≤ 14τ and γL ∈
[
rp(B,A)
2 ,
1
2
)
or λ ≤ 1−2γL(1−rp(B,A))4τ and γL < r
p(B,A)
2
ρ ∈ (0, 1) 14τ < λ < 1rp(B,A)4τ and γL ∈
[
rp(B,A)
2 ,
1
2
)
or 1−2γL(1−rp(B,A))4τ < λ <
1
rp(B,A)4τ and γ
L < r
p(B,A)
2
1 otherwise
where the evaluator’s beliefs in the pooling equilibria are
rp (A,A) =
t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
)
t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
)
+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
and
rp (B,A) =
t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
.
When players randomize, they do so according to the following expressions:
ρ∗ (A,B) = t¯1− t¯
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
λ4τ −
(
2γL − 1
)
2γL − 1 (1.5)
ρ∗ (B,B) = t¯1− t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
(λ4τ − 1) . (1.6)
Some comparative statics are immediately discernible. ρ∗ (A,B) and ρ∗ (B,B)
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weakly increase in λ. With strong career concerns, leaders are loath to admit they
were wrong, preferring to pool with leaders who were correct in period 1.
In addition, ρ∗ (A,B) and ρ∗ (B,B) increase in t¯. As the overall pool of leaders
gets better, it becomes even more tempting for leaders who were incorrect to stick
to their initial mission statements. This is because the evaluator attributes higher
probability to the mission statement being correct, which makes the leader less
willing to spontaneously own up that it was wrong.
Furthermore, ρ∗ (A,B) decreases in γL. As adaptation concerns become more
important to the leader, he is less willing to trade the adaptation payoff for the
coordination and reputation payoff. In contrast, ρ∗ (B,B) does not depend on γL.
For a leader with history (B,B), adaptation and coordination concerns point in the
same direction—B. The only reason for him to choose action A is to manipulate
his reputation by claiming to have been correct in period 1.
Finally, both ρ∗ (A,B) and ρ∗ (B,B) decrease in p∗. This means that as followers
become more reluctant to contradict the mission statement (that is, they more
often follow the leader), it becomes easier to extract at least some of the leader’s
final information. The intuition is straightforward: a contradiction by the follower
decreases the evaluator’s belief that the state of the world is truly what the leader
predicted. Therefore, the leader gets a lower reputational payoff from sticking to the
mission statement. This is particularly true when only very good types of followers
would ever contradict the mission statement. Since the reputational benefit from
sticking to his guns is lower, it is less likely to outweigh the payoff from getting the
decision correct. This means that an incorrect leader will reveal his true signal more
often.
The next section analyzes the implications of the leader’s problem for the fol-
lower.
1.5.2 The follower’s problem
If the firm publishes the leader’s mission statement, the leader may fail to revise his
initial decision even when he receives information that it was incorrect. The leader’s
behavior is then described by Proposition 3. The follower now chooses A if and only
if
Pr (w = A | η)
Pr (w = B | η) ≥

1−ρ∗(A,B)−ρ∗(B,B)+µ[pi(B;B,σ∗)−pi(A;B,σ∗)]
1+µ[pi(A;A,σ∗)−pi(B;A,σ∗)] γ
L ≥ 12
−ρ∗(B,B)+µ[pi(B;B,σ∗∗)−pi(A;B,σ∗∗)]
ρ∗(B,A)+µ[pi(A;A,σ∗∗)−pi(B;A,σ∗∗)] γ
L < 12 .
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The monotone likelihood ratio again implies that there can be no equilibrium in
which s∗F = A, since the right hand side would be less than 1 and the left hand side
greater than 1 for all possible values of p∗. So the follower’s cutoff strategy will be
of the form σ∗ = (B, p∗). The question of interest concerns how p∗ (p∗∗) compares
to p′ (p′′), the benchmark cutoff when the mission statement is not published. If
p∗ > p′, then the anti-herding problem has been mitigated by activating reputation
concerns in the leader. Fewer types of follower will inefficiently contradict the mission
statement in order to signal their ability.
Proposition 4: When the mission statement is published, a PBE in the whole
game exists. The leader’s behavior is as described in Proposition 3, and the follower’s
behavior involves a cutoff (B, p∗) if γL ≥ 12 and (B, p∗∗) if γL < 12 . Both p∗ and
p∗∗decrease in µ and increase in λ. For all parameter values, p∗ ≥ p′ and p∗∗ ≥ p′′.
Note that in this case, it is possible for the follower to start herding rather than
anti-herding on the leader’s signal, that is, for p∗ (p∗∗) > t¯. This could happen, for
instance, if µ were sufficiently small.
I have shown that exposing the leader to market evaluation lessens the anti-
herding problem. It does so by giving the leader incentives to stick with his original
action choice more often, which makes his final action more predictable for the fol-
lower. The follower must therefore be more certain that the leader will discover he
was initially wrong before she is willing to contradict the mission statement. How-
ever, there are costs to this tactic. When γL ≥ 12 , this improvement in coordination
comes at the expense of adaptation. The follower’s reluctance to knowingly take
an inefficient action in order to signal her type is won at the cost of making the
leader reluctant to take the correct action given his knowledge of the state of the
world. When γL < 12 , publishing the mission statement improves adaptation at the
expense of coordination since the leader no longer matches the follower for sure.
Whether or not this trade-off is worthwhile for the firm depends on how highly it
values coordination versus adaptation.
1.5.3 The firm’s payoff
The following results consider a fixed change from p′ to p∗ in the follower’s strategy
and ask when a firm would choose to publish the leader’s mission statement given
the direct effects of parameters of interest. That is, I consider a fixed benefit and
ask when the cost is worthwhile for the firm.
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In the first instance, consider a leader who personally favors adaptation over
coordination.
1.5.3.1 γL ≥ 12
The firm’s payoff becomes
V ∗ = t¯
[
γ + (1− γ)
(
1−
ˆ 1
p∗
(1− s) g (s) ds
)]
+
(
1− t¯
)(
1−
ˆ 1
p∗
sg (s) ds
)
((1− ρ∗ (A,B)) γ + ρ∗ (A,B) (1− γ))
+
(
1− t¯
)ˆ 1
p∗
sg (s) ds (1− ρ∗ (B,B))
I want to know when V ∗ is greater than V ′, the benchmark payoff from section
1.4.2. Note that if the equilibrium is a pooling one
(
λ ≤ 2γL−14τ
)
, where ρ∗ (A,B) =
ρ∗ (B,B) = 0, then p∗ = p′ and the difference between V ∗ and V ′ is 0. Otherwise
there will be a non-zero difference in payoff.
The condition for V ∗ > V ′ is
γ
1− γ <
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) [
ρ∗ (A,B)
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
− ρ∗ (B,B) ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
]
(
1− t¯
) [
ρ∗ (A,B)
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
+ ρ∗ (B,B)
´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
] .
(1.7)
Assumption 1.
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds is non-negative.
Assumption 1 holds either when µ or G
(
t¯
)
is large enough.15 It puts a limit
on the extent to which talented follower types
(
p > t¯
)
start to herd on the mission
statement, ignoring their private information.
In this case publishing the mission statement trades adaptation for coordination.
Inequality (1.7) captures this trade-off. The numerator of the right hand side is the
increased probability of getting the coordination payoff (1− γ). The denominator is
15If assumption 1 is violated it is still possible to prove a similar result to Proposition 5. For
example, in Lemma 5a, as long as
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s) g (s) ds + 2t¯(1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
)
1−γL
2γL−1 > 0,
there will exist some subset
[
λ, 1∆τ
] ⊂ ( 2γL−1∆τ , 1∆τ ] such that for all λ ∈ [λ, 1∆τ ] there exists
γ′1 ≥ 0 such that γ ∈ [0, γ′1] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish the mission statement.
In that case, for λ ∈
(
2γL−1
∆τ , λ
)
, no firm would choose to publish.
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the decreased probability of getting the adaptation payoff γ. Whenever the benefit
from increased coordination outweighs the cost of decreased adaptation, the firm
prefers to publish the mission statement.
As long as the numerator of the right hand side is positive, some types of firm
will choose to publish. If the numerator is positive for ρ∗ (A,B) = ρ∗ (B,B) = 1,
then it is positive for all λ by assumption 1 and equations (1.5) and (1.6). Otherwise
the firm only ever publishes if career concerns are not too strong.
Proposition 5. Let assumption 1 hold and let γL ≥ 12 . For all p∗ > p′, there exists
γλ > 0 such that the firm prefers to publish the mission statement if and only if
γ ∈ [0, γλ] as long as one of the following is true:
1.
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
> 0 and λ > 2γL−14τ
2.
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
≤ 0 and λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ , λ¯
)
, where
λ¯ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
and is unique.
In either case, if γL ∈
[
1
2 ,
1+rp(A,A)
2
]
, γλ (weakly) decreases with λ.
The first case obtains when either t¯ or p∗ is sufficiently high.
Proposition 5 shows that when the leader is inclined to favor adaptation
(
γL ≥ 12
)
,
firms which care sufficiently about coordination find it profitable to publish the
leader’s mission statement. This is because attaching career concerns to the leader
makes him more predictable for the follower. She, in turn, chooses not to disregard
his information so often, which improves coordination. The follower is less likely to
contradict the leader and he is less likely to contradict himself. This makes firms
that care about coordination better off.
Note that this does not require strong disagreement between the firm and the
leader about the value of adaptation versus coordination. For low levels of λ(
λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
1
4τ
]
, for example
)
, it could be the case that γ ≥ γL and still the
firm chooses to publish the leader’s mission statement if
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds is large
enough.
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1.5.3.2 γL < 12
If, on the other hand, γL < 12 , then the firm’s payoff is
V ∗∗ = t¯
[
1−
ˆ 1
p∗
(1− s) g (s) ds+
ˆ 1
p∗
(1− s) g (s) ds [ρ (B,A) γ + (1− ρ (B,A)) (1− γ)]
]
+
(
1− t¯
) [(
1−
ˆ 1
p∗
sg (s) ds
)
(1− γ) +
ˆ 1
p∗
sg (s) ds (1− ρ∗ (B,B))
]
Note again that if the equilibrium is a pooling one
(
λ ≤ 1−2γL(1−rp(B,A))4τ
)
, where
ρ∗ (B,A) = ρ∗ (B,B) = 0 and p∗∗ = p′′, then V ∗∗ = V ′′. Otherwise there will be
a non-zero difference in payoff, and the condition for this difference being positive
is
γ
1− γ >
t¯ρ∗ (B,A)
´ 1
p∗∗ (1− s) g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
)
ρ∗ (B,B)
´ 1
p∗∗ sg (s) ds´ p∗∗
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯ρ∗ (B,A)
´ 1
p∗∗ (1− s) g (s) ds−
(
1− t¯
)
ρ∗ (B,B)
´ 1
p∗∗ sg (s) ds
.
Here the firm is trading coordination for adaptation. When the increase in payoff
from better adaptation outweighs the cost in coordination, the firm publishes the
mission statement.
Proposition 6. Let assumption 1 hold and let γL < 12 . For all p
∗∗ > p′′ and all
λ > 1−2γ
L
(1−rp(B,A))4τ , there exists a γλ < 1 such that the firm prefers to publish the
mission statement if and only if γ ∈ [γλ, 1]. γλ (weakly) increases in λ.
Proposition 6 shows that when the leader is biased in favor of coordination,
firms that care sufficiently about adaptation find it profitable to publish the leader’s
mission statement. This is because when career concerns do not apply, the leader
simply matches the follower. This means the follower has effectively no decision
concerns and makes her decision entirely based on the effect it will have on her
in-firm reputation. Publishing the mission statement, and therefore making the
leader less willing to change his mind, disciplines the follower. If she too zealously
disregards the leader’s information in order to signal her own ability, she risks the
leader being unwilling to match her and losing out on the decision component of
her payoff. This makes her less likely to favor her own information over the leader’s
better information, meaning that the final decision is more likely to be the correct
one even if the leader most often chooses to match the follower. Note again that
it is not necessary for the firm and the leader to have radically different priorities.
When λ is close to 14τ , it could be the case that γ ≤ γL < 12 and the firm would still
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prefer to publish.
1.6 Non-strategic Conservatism
Instead of publishing the mission statement to attach career concerns to the leader’s
decision problem, the firm may opt to improve coordination by other, non-strategic,
means. By this I mean the firm can choose a leader’s characteristics or adopt a policy
that prevents the leader from revisiting his initial decision in some cases. One such
mechanism is hiring an overconfident leader. This would entail a leader who is not
subject to reputation concerns, but who is nevertheless more prone to sticking with
his initial impression because he simply believes he is right. Thus, overconfidence
in the leader serves the same function as career concerns—both make the leader
less likely to change his mind once he’s decided on the mission statement, and
therefore more predictable for the follower. Another option would be to select a
heavy workload for the leader such that some decisions cannot be revisited in time
to adjust direction before profits are generated.
In the context of this model, non-strategic conservatism is modeled as follows: a
fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of decisions are never revised given new information. It could be
that in some cases the leader is so convinced his initial impression is correct that
he does not even bother looking at the new information that comes in period 3,
or that instead he simply does not have time to consider new evidence before the
decision is irreversible. I assume that the leader’s failure to consider new information
does not depend on the follower’s action. α can be interpreted as the degree of
overconfidence/overwork; as α gets close to 1, the leader is unlikely ever to change
directions once he has made his initial choice.
1.6.1 Conservative leader
As the following sections show, non-strategic conservatism produces a similar effect
on follower anti-herding. Regardless of the leader’s attitude toward coordination
and adaptation, if he occasionally fails to revise his initial decision, the follower’s
incentives to strategically disregard the mission statement are reduced. Whether or
not the firm wishes to take advantage of this depends on γ.
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1.6.1.1 γL ≥ 12
With probability 1 − α the leader acts as in section 1.4 on page 17. The follower
chooses action A if and only if
Pr (w = A | η)
Pr (w = B | η) ≥
1− 2α + µ [pi (B;B, σα)− pi (A;B, σα)]
1 + µ [pi (A;A, σα)− pi (B;A, σα)]
with pα defined as the value of p that satisfies the expression with equality. Note
that pα > p′ and that pα increases in α. Here again, if α is large enough it may be
the case that the follower herds rather than anti-herds
(
pα > t¯
)
.
The firm’s payoff
The firm’s payoff is given by
V α = t¯
[
γ + (1− γ)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
(1− s) g (s) ds
)]
+
(
1− t¯
) [(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)
(α (1− γ) + (1− α) γ) +
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds (1− α)
]
.
Comparing this value to the firm’s payoff when α = 0 (and pα = p′), the condition
for the firm to prefer an α > 0 is
γ
1− γ <
´ pα
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ α
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)
α
(
1− t¯
) . (1.8)
Clearly whether or not any type of firm would choose to employ an α > 0 to
engender leader conservatism depends on the sign of the right hand side.
Proposition 7. For any pα > p′ and α > 0 such that
´ pα
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds +
α
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)
> 0, there exists a γα ∈ (0, 1) such that the firm
prefers conservatism of degree α > 0 to α = 0 if and only if γ ∈ [0, γα].
The inequality will be satisfied when t¯ or pα is sufficiently high. This result
parallels Proposition 5. If the leader prefers adaptation, then firms which care
sufficiently about coordination prefer that the leader be conservative.
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1.6.1.2 γL < 12
The follower chooses A if and only if
Pr (w = A | η)
Pr (w = B | η) ≥
−α + µ [pi (B;B, σαα)− pi (A;B, σαα)]
α + µ [pi (A;A, σαα)− pi (B;A, σαα)]
with pαα defined as the value of p that satisfies this expression with equality, noting
that pαα > p′′ and that pαα increases in α with the possibility of herding
(
pαα > t¯
)
.
The firm’s payoff
The firm’s payoff becomes
V αα = t¯
[
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds+
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds (αγ + (1− α) (1− γ))
]
+
(
1− t¯
) [(
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds
)
(1− γ) +
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds (1− α)
]
and the condition for V αα > V ′′ is
γ
1− γ >
t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds´ pαα
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds−
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds
.
(1.9)
Proposition 8. For all pαα > p′′ and α > 0 such that
´ pαα
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds +
t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds −
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds 6= 0, there exists γα < 1 such
that the firm prefers to induce conservatism of degree α if and only if γ ∈ [γα, 1].
This result parallels Proposition 6. If the leader prefers coordination, then firms
which care sufficiently about adaptation prefer that the leader be conservative.
The results in this section echo those of section 1.5.3 on page 27. This indicates
that strategic and non-strategic conservatism in the leader are substitutes from the
firm’s perspective.
1.6.2 Non-strategic follower
If it is the case that leaders are apt to overestimate their ability in some cases, then
it stands to reason that followers might also incorrectly perceive their ability. And
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if leaders are occasionally overworked and let due diligence slip through the cracks,
then so too might followers.
Unlike the leader’s case, overconfidence and overwork produce opposite results
for the follower. An overconfident follower is likely to place too much weight on
her own information because she believes it to be highly accurate. By contrast, an
overworked (or underconfident) follower is likely to place too little weight on her
private information in favor of simply using publicly available information in the
form of the mission statement.
1.6.2.1 Overconfident follower
Let the follower’s overconfidence be modeled as follows: with some probability
β ∈ (0, 1), she becomes convinced that her signal is correct. This means that in
her indifference condition the probability ratio Pr(w=A|η)
Pr(w=B|η) is either 0 or unboundedly
large, so that she will follow her signal regardless of the mission statement. With
probability 1 − β she behaves as in the previous section, with the cutoff value pα
(or pαα) appropriate to the leader’s behavior. Overconfidence in the follower thus
enhances the effect of career concerns, in that the follower too often contradicts the
mission statement relative to the benchmark. An overconfident follower is ‘immod-
erate’ rather than conservative.
Let p¯ ≡ E [p]. Then, for γL ≥ 12 the firm’s payoff is
V β = t¯
[
γ + (1− γ)
[
βp¯+ (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
(1− s) g (s) ds
)]]
+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− α)
[
γ + (1− γ)
(
βp¯+ (1− β)
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)]
(1.10)
+
(
1− t¯
)
α (1− γ)
(
β (1− p¯) + (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
))
.
If γL < 12 , then
V ββ = t¯β (p¯+ (1− p¯) (αγ + (1− α) (1− γ)))
+t¯ (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds+
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds (αγ + (1− α) (1− γ))
)
+
(
1− t¯
)
β (p¯ (1− α) + (1− p¯) (1− γ))
+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− β)
((
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds
)
(1− γ) +
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds (1− α)
)
.
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1.6.2.2 Overworked/underconfident follower
A follower can also be time-constrained and not be able to fully incorporate all
the available information when she takes her decision. When this is the case, she
would excessively rely on public information. It is also possible for the follower to be
underconfident. This is a story in which the follower occasionally becomes convinced
her signal is wrong, and that she is better off following the leader and acting based
on the mission statement than paying attention to her own signal. Both of these
scenarios produce the same result.
In this model a conservative follower has probability βˆ of following the mission
statement for sure, regardless of sF . With probability 1 − βˆ, the follower acts as
above (pα or pαα). For simplicity say that βˆ = β, so that the firm’s choice is between
followers who are equally likely to depart from the benchmark, just in opposite
directions. The firm’s payoff in the case of underconfidence when γL ≥ 12 is
V Bˆ = t¯
[
γ + (1− γ)
[
β + (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
(1− s) g (s) ds
)]]
+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− α)
[
γ + (1− γ) (1− β)
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
]
+
(
1− t¯
)
α (1− γ)
(
β + (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
))
.
If γL < 12 , then
V βˆβˆ = t¯
[
β + (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds
)]
+t¯ (1− β)
ˆ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds (αγ + (1− α) (1− γ))
+
(
1− t¯
) [
β (1− γ) + (1− β)
(
1−
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds
)
(1− γ)
]
+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− β)
ˆ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds (1− α) .
1.6.2.3 The firm’s payoff
To see which type of follower is preferred by the firm, I compare the payoffs from
employing a conservative versus an immoderate follower. The firm strictly prefers a
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conservative follower to an immoderate follower if and only if
t¯ (1− p¯)(
1− t¯
)
p¯
>
1− 2α γ
L ≥ 12
γ−α
α(1−γ)+γ(1−α) γ
L < 12 .
(1.11)
In each case the right hand side is less than 1. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 9. For any level of leader overconfidence α and any β for the follower,
if E [t] > E [p], the firm prefers a conservative follower to an immoderate one.
If the titles ‘leader’ and ‘follower’ are taken seriously, it is quite natural to assume
that a leader would be on average of better quality than a follower. Leaders have
been promoted up because they have demonstrated high ability in their previous
positions.
Proposition 9 has different implications depending on the source of non-strategic
behavior. If personality traits are the source, then the firm needs an overconfident
leader but an underconfident follower. This would affect the firm’s hiring and pro-
motion practice in that the firm might want to hire different types of individuals for
different positions in the firm hierarchy. However, the firm’s payoff is increasing in
the expected ability of the leader, and ability is likely easier to observe within the
firm than without.16
One (unmodeled) implication of this is that the firm might face a trade-off be-
tween hiring overconfident followers but getting to select the best ones for promotion
to leadership positions, or hiring underconfident followers and having to recruit lead-
ers from outside the firm. This trade-off was not present previously, when the agent
characteristic of interest was the level of reputation concern.
If, on the other hand, the firm uses workload to affect the leader’s incentives, then
increasing the workload (and reducing agents’ ability to fully incorporate all available
information into their decisions) produces changes in the appropriate direction for
each level of the hierarchy. Overworked leaders occasionally fail to reverse bad
decisions, and overworked followers sometimes implement the mission statement by
rote.
16For a slightly different take on the career prospects of overconfident followers, see Goel and
Thakor (2008).
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1.7 Empirical Predictions
In this section I briefly consider the empirical predictions of this model. I have
indicated a way in which it might be possible to distinguish between reputation
concern and overconfidence.
The analysis in sections 1.5 and 1.6 suggests a way to differentiate leaders who are
strategically conservative from those who are non-strategically conservative. Leaders
in the latter category will change their minds too infrequently regardless of the level
of information provided to the market about their early decisions. Publishing the
mission statement or not plays no role in their decision to revise their initial decision
or follow through on the original plan.
In contrast, leaders who are interested in appearing to be confident should respond
to the dissemination of information about their initial prediction. Lemma 1 showed
that, if the mission statement is not published, a rational leader has no interest
in taking an inefficient decision in the final period, regardless of how the follower
behaves. By Proposition 3, however, he might fail to incorporate new information
into his final decision if it reveals unfavorable information to the market because his
early predictions were publicized. The prediction is therefore that overconfident or
overworked leaders fail to update based on new information whether or not the firm
chooses to disclose information about corporate strategy to the market, whereas
rational (but career-concerned) leaders will only under-respond to new information
when doing so makes them look better to outsiders because they avoid owning up
to mistakes.
1.8 Conclusion
When should a firm disclose its strategic direction to outsiders? When should a firm
hire an overconfident leader (or heap responsibilities on a rational one)? How might
one tell the difference between reputation concerns and rote conservatism in leader
behavior? In this paper I have attempted to address these questions, and shown that
the answers depend on how important coordination and adaptation are to the firm.
Firms will choose to attach career concerns to their adaptation-minded leaders when
coordination is sufficiently important, and to their coordination-minded leaders if
the converse is true.
If anti-herding is a concern, such that the firm needs to stop followers taking
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inefficient actions in order to signal high ability, then even firms who strongly prefer
one of the two payoff components prefer to publish. In some cases, a firm could
achieve the same effect by hiring an overconfident leader, but overconfident followers
present a problem. Firms prefer followers to be underconfident, which poses difficulty
for organizations that hope to use follower positions as proving grounds for future
leaders. As an alternative, a firm could just crowd the in-box of its employees at all
levels.
This model is quite simple, and would benefit from extensions. It would be
interesting and useful to consider an extension with multiple followers. The results
from BBV suggest that coordination amongst the followers themselves would be
improved by the two mechanisms discussed here, making it even more attractive
for firms to publish the mission statement, but it would be useful to check this in
context. Finally, the binary state in which the leader learns the true state in period
3 is somewhat limiting, and it would be interesting to consider a model with a richer
action space and some residual uncertainty.
The main message of the paper is that reputation concerns are a useful lever
for firms who wish to provide incentives to coordinate, as are behavioral traits like
overconfidence and firm-wide policies like increased workload. I have provided some
empirical predictions, and hopefully with further research this line of inquiry will
produce useful insight into firm behavior.
Appendix
Preliminaries
Follower’s indifference condition
Section 1.4.2 on page 20: The cutoff strategy σ′ satisfies
Pr (w = A | η) (1 + µpi (A;A, σ′)) + Pr (w = B | η)µpi (A;B, σ′)
= Pr (w = A | η)µpi (B;A, σ′) + Pr (w = B | η) (1 + µpi (B;B, σ′))
if γL ≥ 12 , and if γL < 12 it satisfies
1 + Pr (w = A | η)µpi (A;A, σ′) + Pr (w = B | η)µpi (A;B, σ′)
= 1 + Pr (w = A | η)µpi (B;A, σ′) + Pr (w = B | η)µpi (B;B, σ′) .
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Section 1.5.2 on page 26: The cutoff strategy σ∗ satisfies
Pr (w = A | η) (1 + µpi (A;A, σ∗)) + Pr (w = B | η) (ρ (A,B) + µpi (A;B, σ∗))
= Pr (w = A | η)µpi (B;A, σ∗) + Pr (w = B | η) (1− ρ (B,B) + µpi (B;B, σ∗))
if γL ≥ 12 , and if γL < 12 it satisfies
Pr (w = A | η) (1 + µpi (A;A, σ∗∗)) + Pr (w = B | η) (1 + µpi (A;B, σ∗∗))
= Pr (w = A | η) (1− ρ (B,A) + µpi (B;A, σ∗∗))
+Pr (w = B | η) (1− ρ (B,B) + µpi (B;B, σ∗∗)) .
Section 1.6.1.1 on page 32: The cutoff strategy σα satisfies
Pr (w = A | η) (1 + µpi (A;A, σα)) + Pr (w = B | η) (α + µpi (A;B, σα))
= Pr (w = A | η)µpi (B;A, σα) + Pr (w = B | η) (1− α + µpi (B;B, σα)) .
Section 1.6.1.2 on page 33: The cutoff strategy σαα satisfies
Pr (w = A | η) (1 + µpi (A;A, σαα)) + Pr (w = B | η) (1 + µpi (A;B, σαα))
= Pr (w = A | η) (1− α + µpi (B;A, σαα)) + Pr (w = B | η) (1− α + µpi (B;B, σαα)) .
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Formulae for r(aF , a2)
From Bayes’ rule, given s∗F = B:
r (A,A) =
t¯ρ (A,A)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
t¯ρ (A,A)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
+
(
1− t¯
)
ρ (A,B)
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
] (1.12)
r (A,B) =
t¯ (1− ρ (A,A))
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
t¯ (1− ρ (A,A))
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
]
+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− ρ (A,B))
[
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
](1.13)
r (B,A) =
t¯ρ (B,A)
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
t¯ρ (B,A)
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
)
ρ (B,B)
´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
(1.14)
r (B,B) =
t¯ (1− ρ (B,A)) ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
t¯ (1− ρ (B,A)) ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
)
(1− ρ (B,B)) ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
(1.15)
Similar expressions can be found for when s∗F = A. Notice that r (aF , A) decreases
in p∗ for aF ∈ {A,B}.
A note on equilibrium selection
Recall the equilibrium in the leader’s subgame laid out in Proposition 3. For λ ∈[
1−2γL
4τ ,
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ
]
and γL < 12 , there is also an equilibrium in which a leader with
(B,A) randomizes,17 where he does so with probability
ρ (B,A) = 1− 1− t¯
t¯
´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
λ4τ −
(
1− 2γL
)
1− 2γL .
It is immediately apparent that ρ (B,A) decreases with λ, which is somewhat per-
verse, given that stronger career concerns generally encourage sticking with the
mission statement rather than reversing it.
Any time there is an equilibrium in which a leader with (B,A) randomizes, there
is also an equilibrium in which he chooses B for sure. The latter is the equilibrium
preferred by the leader and is the one I analyze for the results in Proposition 6. If
instead I consider the semi-separating equilibrium, then the range of λ over which
some types of firm choose to publish increases.
In Proposition 6, λ ∈
[
1−2γL
4τ ,
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ
]
means the firm is indifferent between
publishing and not for all values of γ, since the pooling equilibrium arises. If the
17Recall that if (B,A) randomizes, then (B,B) always plays B.
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semi-separating equilibrium arises, then for all λ in this range, there exists a γλ < 1
such that the firm prefers to publish the mission statement if and only if γ ∈ [γλ, 1].
I have therefore given a lower bound on how often firms would be expected to
publish.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider first the case of γL ≥ 12 . Given a1 = A, the follower
should take action A if and only if Pr(w=A|η)
Pr(w=B|η) ≥ 1. For any p, the left hand side of
this expression is t¯p(1−t¯)(1−p) if sF = A, which is always greater than 1. If sF = B, the
left hand side is t¯(1−p)(1−t¯)p , which strictly decreases in p and equals 1 at exactly p = t¯.
If, on the other hand, γL < 12 , then since the follower is indifferent between actions
A and B given the leader’s strategy, an admissible equilibrium strategy is for her to
choose aF = A if and only if Pr (w = A | η) ≥ Pr (w = B | η). 
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows from Proposition 1 of Levy (2004) and
backwards induction.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The leader’s choice between A and B requires comparing (assuming aF = A)
γLPr (w = A | w)+
(
1− γL
)
+λτ−a1 (A;A, ρ) R γLPr (w = B | w)+λτ−a1 (B;A, ρ)
(1.16)
where τ−a1 (a2; aF , ρ) is the evaluator’s belief about the leader’s type given that a1
is unobserved, and given the observed action pair (aF , a2)and conjectured strategy
ρ for the leader.
From (1.16), any equilibrium in which γL ≥ 12 but a2 6= w must involve some
beliefs for E given aF that involve τ−a1 (a; aF , ρ) < τ−a1 (a′; aF , ρ), otherwise when
w = a, L would deviate. This means that, given aF , E believes that a leader who
chooses action a is more likely to have been incorrect than a leader who chooses
action a′. But if the true state is indeed a, then any beliefs for E that make it
worthwhile for type s1 6= w to choose a also make it worthwhile for type s1 = w
to choose a. Divinity thus eliminates beliefs that place higher probability on type
s1 6= w playing a, and hence all equilibria in which a2 6= w because there is some
action pair that E conjectures is more likely to come from an incorrect leader.
Similarly, any equilibrium in which γL < 12 but a2 6= aF must involve some beliefs
for E that satisfy τ−a1 (a; a, ρ) < τ−a1 (a′; a, ρ), otherwise L would certainly match
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the follower regardless of w. But regardless of the state, any beliefs for E that make
it worthwhile for type s1 6= w to choose a2 = aF also make it worthwhile for type
s1 = w to choose aF . Divinity eliminates such beliefs, and therefore all equilibria
in which a2 6= aF because E conjectures only incorrect leaders match the follower.

Proof of Lemma 2.
Suppose there is a pooling equilibrium where ρ (A,A) = ρ (A,B) = 0. That is,
both types of leader reverse their initial decisions if the follower agrees with them.
If this is an equilibrium, it must be that E has off-equilibrium-path beliefs that a
deviation is more likely to have come from a leader who was initially incorrect, or
r (A,A) < r (A,B). But for all beliefs of E that make type (A,B) deviate, type
(A,A) also wants to deviate since 1 ≥ 1 − 2γL. Divinity then requires r (A,A) ≥
r (A,B). This restriction on beliefs refines away all pooling equilibria in which both
types reverse their initial decisions. Next consider fully separating equilibria. If
ρ (A,A) = 0 (i.e. type (A,A) always plays B), then type (A,B) would strictly prefer
to play B as well, so no separation can occur in that direction. In a semi-separating
equilibrium, if type (A,A) plays B with positive probability, he must be indifferent
between playing A and B, which requires r (A,A) < r (A,B). This means that
type (A,B) strictly prefers B. Bayesian updating then requires r (A,A) > r (A,B),
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 establishes that ρ∗ (A,A) = 1. By 1.13 and Bayes’ rule, r (A,B) = 0.
Furthermore, only one of (B,A) and (B,B) can randomize in any equilibrium. To
see this, note that if one of them randomizes, he must be indifferent between his
action choices. If this is the case, then the other strictly prefers one of the options.
1. aF = A
The only history I need to consider is (A,B), since Lemma 1 covers (A,A).
There are 3 possible types of equilibrium behavior for (A,B): pooling, sepa-
rating, and semi-separating.
a) A necessary and sufficient condition for a pooling equilibrium (ρ (A,B) = 1)
is λ ≥ 2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ . To see this, note that beliefs off the equilibrium path
are pinned down by D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987) as r (A,B) = 0, since
a leader with (A,B) has the most to gain from a deviation from this
pooling equilibrium. The surviving equilibrium is unique. To see neces-
42
sity, notice that (A,B) plays A if and only if the inequality is satisfied.
Sufficiency comes from the fact that if (A,B) has no incentive to deviate,
then (A,A) has even less incentive to deviate.
b) A necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium (ρ (A,B) = 0)
is λ ≤ 2γL−14τ . Beliefs from Bayes’ rule are r (A,A) = 1 and r (A,B) = 0.
To see necessity, note that (A,B) plays B for sure if and only if the in-
equality is satisfied. To see sufficiency, note that if (A,B) has no incentive
to deviate, neither does (A,A).
c) A necessary and sufficient condition for a semi-separating equilibrium
(ρ (A,B) ∈ (0, 1)) is λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
)
. If (A,B)is willing to ran-
domize, it must be the case that
λr (A,A)4τ = 2γL − 1.
Given (1.12) and p∗, this pins down
ρ (A,B) = t¯1− t¯
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
λ4τ −
(
2γL − 1
)
2γL − 1
 .
This value is unique. A necessary and sufficient condition for this ρ (A,B)
to be between 0 and 1 is the condition given above. Sufficiency for an
equilibrium follows from the fact that if (A,B) does not want to deviate,
then neither does (A,A).
Note that if γL < 12 , then ρ
∗ (A,B) = 1 for all λ.
2. aF = B
There are five possible combinations of strategies given histories (B,A) and
(B,B), depending on the value of λ. Some of these may overlap.
a) ρ (B,A) = ρ (B,B) = 0
Beliefs on the equilibrium path are r (B,B) = rp (B,A). D1 from Cho
and Kreps pins down r (B,A) = 1 since (B,A) has the most to gain from
a deviation. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium in
which there is pooling on B is λ ≤ 1−2γL(1−rp(B,A))4τ . To see necessity, note
that (B,A) only plays B for sure if the inequality is satisfied. If (B,A)
has no incentive to deviate, then neither does (B,B), which provides
sufficiency.
b) ρ (B,A) ∈ (0, 1), ρ (B,B) = 0
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Bayes’ rule requires r (B,A) = 1. If (B,A) is willing to randomize, it is
necessary that
λ4τ = λr (B,B)4τ + 1− 2γL.
Given (1.15) and p∗, this pins down
ρ (B,A) = 1− 1− t¯
t¯
´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
λ4τ −
(
1− 2γL
)
1− 2γL .
This value is unique. A necessary and sufficient condition for this ρ (B,A)
to be between 0 and 1 is λ ∈
(
1−2γL
4τ ,
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ
)
. Sufficiency for an
equilibrium comes from the fact that if (B,A) is willing to randomize
and does not want to deviate, then (B,B) strictly prefers B and has no
incentive to deviate.
c) ρ (B,A) = 1, ρ (B,B) = 0
Beliefs are r (B,A) = 1 and r (B,B) = 0. A necessary and sufficient
condition for a fully separating equilibrium is λ ∈
(
1−2γL
4τ ,
1
4τ
)
. To see
necessity, see that (B,A) playing A for sure given these beliefs requires
λ4τ > 1− 2γL
and that (B,B) playing B for sure requires
λ4τ < 1.
Sufficiency follows from the fact that if λ is in this range, then neither
(B,A) nor (B,B) has a profitable deviation.
d) ρ (B,A) = 1, ρ (B,B) ∈ (0, 1)
Bayes’ rule determines r (B,B) = 0. If (B,B) is willing to randomize, it
must be the case that
λr (B,A)4τ = 1.
Given (1.14) and p∗, this pins down
ρ (B,B) = t¯1− t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
(λ4τ − 1) .
This value is unique. A necessary and sufficient condition for this ρ (B,B)
to be between 0 and 1 is λ ∈
(
1
4τ ,
1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
. Sufficiency for an equilib-
rium comes from the fact that if (B,B) is willing to randomize and does
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not want to deviate, then (B,A) strictly prefers A and has no incentive
to deviate.
e) ρ (B,A) = ρ (B,B) = 1
Beliefs on the equilibrium path are r (B,A) = rp (B,A). D1 from Cho
and Kreps pins down r (B,B) = 0 since (B,B) has the most to gain from
a deviation. (B,B) plays A for sure if and only if λ ≥ 1
rp(B,A)4τ . This is
sufficient for an equilibrium since if (B,B) has no incentive to deviate,
then neither does a leader with (B,A).
The rest of the proposition follows from considering all possible values of λ and
pairing the equilibrium strategies of the leader following the possible histories given
that value of λ (for all values of γL). For γL < 12 , multiple equilibria are possible for
some values of λ due to the behavior of (B,A). When this is the case, I select the
equilibrium least likely to induce the firm to publish. When γL ≥ 12 , ρ∗ (B,A) = 1 for
all λ, so since the behavior of (A,B) and (B,B) is unique (given λ), the equilibrium
is unique.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Backwards inducting from period 3, the leader’s behavior is as described in Propo-
sition 3. To see that an equilibrium exists in the follower’s subgame, recall the
equilibrium condition
t¯ (1− p)(
1− t¯
)
p
=

1−ρ(A,B)−ρ(B,B)+µ[pi(B;B,σ)−pi(A;B,σ)]
1+µ[pi(A;A,σ)−pi(B;A,σ)] γ
L ≥ 12
−ρ(B,B)+µ[pi(B;B,σ)−pi(A;B,σ)]
ρ(B,A)+µ[pi(A;A,σ)−pi(B;A,σ)] γ
L < 12
Consider first γL ≥ 12 . Section 1.5.1 showed that ρ∗ (A,B) and ρ∗ (B,B) decrease
in p∗, so together with the results from Levy (2004), the right hand side of the
equilibrium condition increases in p∗. The left hand side decreases with p∗ from
something greater than 1 to 0. Therefore, if a p∗ exists that equates the two sides,
it must be when s∗F = B.
To see how such a p∗ differs from p′, consider the case of p∗ = p′. Since ρ∗ (A,B) ≥
0 and ρ∗ (B,B) ≥ 0, There is only one instance in which indifference is maintained
at p′. This is when ρ∗ (A,B) = ρ∗ (B,B) = 0, which happens when λ is sufficiently
low (see Proposition 3). If ρ∗ (A,B) and/or ρ∗ (B,B) are greater than 0, then
indifference is broken at the cutoff point p′. The right hand side is now lower, which
means that a follower of type (B, p′) would strictly prefer action A. Since the left
hand side decreases with p, this implies a higher cutoff value to restore indifference.
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Hence, p∗ > p′. By the same reasoning, p∗∗ > p′′ when γL < 12 .
As in Proposition 2, p∗ and p∗∗ decrease in µ since the right hand side of the
equilibrium condition increases in µ, implying lower cutoff values. To see that p∗
and p∗∗ increase in λ, consider a value p˜ that equalizes the two sides of the equilibrium
condition. Recall that for a given p∗, ρ (aF , s2) increases in λ. So regardless of γL,
an increase in λ reduces the right hand side, breaking indifference. This requires
a higher cutoff p > p˜ to restore indifference at the higher value of λ. In the event
of no indifference (for example if λ is quite large relative to µ), the follower would
always follow the leader and p∗ = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
The proof proceeds via a number of lemmas.
If λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
1
4τ
]
, then ρ∗ (B,B) = 0, and the firm’s condition is
γ
1− γ <
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
)
ρ∗ (A,B)
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
(
1− t¯
)
ρ∗ (A,B)
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
Substituting in the expression for ρ (A,B) from (1.5) and solving, I get that this
expression is equivalent to
γ
1− γ <
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
) (λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1
)
t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
) (
λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1
) .
Lemma 5a. Let assumption 1 hold. For all p∗ > p′, and all λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
1
4τ
]
, there
exists γλ ≥ 12 such that γ ∈ [0, γλ] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish the
mission statement. γλ decreases with λ.
Proof of Lemma 5a. The right hand side of the inequality is greater than or
equal to 1 for all p∗ > p′, and all λ ∈
(
2γL−1
4τ ,
1
4τ
]
provided γL ≥ 12 and assumption
1 holds.
Define γλ as the value of γ ≥ 12 such that
γλ
1− γλ =
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
)(λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1
)
t¯
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
) (
λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1
)
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so that a firm of γλ is indifferent between publishing and not publishing. Then,
all firms with 0 ≤ γ <γλ strictly prefer to publish the mission statement. To see
that γλ (weakly) decreases in λ, note that the right hand side of the firm’s condition
decreases with λ, corresponding to a lower γ that renders the firm indifferent between
publishing and not.
If 14τ < λ <
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ (which requires γ
L ≥ 1+rp(A,A)2 ), then both ρ∗ (A,B) ∈ (0, 1)
and ρ∗ (B,B) ∈ (0, 1) . The firm’s condition in this case is γ1−γ less than
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯
[(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
) (
λ4τ+1−2γL
2γL−1
)
− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds (λ4τ − 1)
]
t¯
[(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
) (
λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1
)
+
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds (λ4τ − 1)
] .
Lemma 5b. Let assumption 1 hold. For all p∗ > p′, and all λ ∈
(
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
)
,
there exists γλ > 0 such that γ ∈ [0, γλ] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish
the mission statement.
Proof of Lemma 5b. The right hand side of the firm’s condition is always posi-
tive if assumption 1 holds, since
(
1− ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
)
>
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds and
λ4τ−(2γL−1)
2γL−1 > λ4τ−1 for γL ≥ 12 . Then the reasoning from Lemma 5a applies.
This is the only case for which I have not proved that γλ decreases in λ.
If λ ∈
(
max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
, 1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
, then ρ∗ (A,B) = 1 and ρ∗ (B,B) ∈ (0, 1).
The condition for the firm publishing the mission statement is (1.7) which simplifies
to the following after substitution using (1.6)
γ
1− γ <
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
− t¯ ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds (λ4τ − 1)(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
+ t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds (λ4τ − 1)
.
Lemma 5c. Let assumption 1 hold. One of the following is true:
1. For all p∗ > p′, and all λ ∈
(
max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
, 1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
, there exists
γλ > 0 such that γ ∈ [0, γλ] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish the
mission statement. γλ decreases with λ.
2. There exists a λ¯ ∈
(
max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
, 1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
such that for all p∗ > p′,
and all λ ∈
(
max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
, λ¯
)
, there exists γλ > 0 such that γ ∈ [0, γλ]
implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish the mission statement. γλ decreases
with λ. If λ ≥ λ¯, no type of firm prefers to publish.
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Proof of Lemma 5c. The right hand side of the firm’s condition decreases with λ.
If the right hand side is positive, there exists a γλ > 0 that equalizes the two sides.
Then, for all γ < γλ, the firm strictly prefers to publish. If max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
=
1
4τ , the right hand side is maximally
´ p∗
p′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds+(1−t¯)(1−
´ 1
p∗ sg(s)ds)
(1−t¯)(1−´ 1p∗ sg(s)ds) , which is positive
for all p∗ given assumption 1. If max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
= 2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ , then the right
hand side is maximally
´ p∗
p′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds+(1−t¯)(1−
´ 1
p∗ sg(s)ds)−t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds
(
2γL−1
rp(A,A)−1
)
(1−t¯)(1−´ 1p∗ sg(s)ds)+t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds
(
2γL−1
rp(A,A)−1
) , which
is minimal when γL = 1. In this case, the condition becomes
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
− t¯ ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds1−t¯t¯
(1−´ 1p∗ sg(s)ds)
(1−´ 1p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds)(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
+ t¯
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds1−t¯t¯
(1−´ 1p∗ sg(s)ds)
(1−´ 1p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds)
=
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
) 1−2 ´ 1p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds
1−´ 1p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
1
1−´ 1p∗ (1−s)g(s)ds
which is positive for all p∗ since 1 > 2
´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds and given assumption 1.
Then for all γL ∈
[
1+rp(A,A)
2 , 1
]
, the right hand side is also positive at its maximum.
Recall that γL in this range is required for max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
= 2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ .
As λ → 1
rp(B,A)4τ , the right hand side of the firm’s condition goes to´ p∗
p′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds+(1−t¯)(1−2
´ 1
p∗ sg(s)ds)
1−t¯ . If this is positive, then over the whole range of λ
in question, low γ types of firm find it profitable to publish the mission statement. If
this is negative, then by continuity there is some λ¯ ∈
(
max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
, 1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
such that
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
−t¯ ´ 1
p∗ (1− s) g (s) ds
(
λ¯4τ − 1
)
=
0. Then for all λ < λ¯, there there exists a γλ > 0 that equalizes the two sides, and
for all γ < γλ the firm strictly prefers to publish. For all λ ≥ λ¯, no type of firm
publishes the mission statement.
To see that when γλ exists it decreases with λ, recall that the right hand side of
the firm’s condition decreases with λ, implying a lower value of γλ to equalize the
two sides.
If λ ≥ 1
rp(B,A)4τ , then ρ
∗ (A,B) = ρ∗ (B,B) = 1. The firm’s condition becomes
γ
1− γ <
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
1− t¯ .
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Lemma 5d. Let λ ≥ 1
rp(B,A)4τ . For all p
∗ > p′, if
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
>
0, then there exists γ¯ > 0 such that γ ∈ [0, γ¯] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to
publish the mission statement. If
´ p∗
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
p∗ sg (s) ds
)
≤
0, then no firm ever chooses to publish.
Proof of Lemma 5d. This follows from the proof of Lemma 5c. 
To see that if γL ∈
[
1
2 ,
1+rp(A,A)
2
]
, γλ decreases with λ, note that the only time
both types (A,B) and (B,B) randomize, making it uncertain whether the right
hand side decreases in λ, is when max
{
1
4τ ,
2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ
}
= 2γL−1
rp(A,A)4τ , which requires
γL > 1+r
p(A,A)
2 . Otherwise, the right hand side of (1.7) weakly decreases in λ,
corresponding to a decreasing γλ that equalizes the two sides. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Since p′′ < p′ and p∗∗ < p∗, if assumption 1 holds, then
´ p∗∗
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds is also
non-negative.
The proof proceeds in two lemmas.
Lemma 6a. Let assumption 1 hold. For all p∗∗ > p′′ and all λ ∈
(
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ ,
1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
,
there exists a γλ < 1 such that γ ∈ [γλ, 1] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish
the mission statement. γλ increases in λ.
Proof of Lemma 6a.
If λ ∈
(
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ ,
1
rp(B,A)4τ
)
, then by Proposition 3 ρ∗ (B,A) = 1 and ρ∗ (B,B) ∈
[0, 1).
Substituting in for ρ∗ (B,B) from (1.6), the condition becomes
γ
1− γ >

t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)ds´ p∗∗
p′′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds+t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)ds
ρ∗ (B,B) = 0
t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)dsλ4τ´ p∗∗
p′′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds+t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)ds(2−λ4τ)
ρ∗ (B,B) ∈ (0, 1)
(1.17)
If λ is low enough that ρ∗ (B,B) = 0, then the first case in (1.17) obtains. This
happens if 12 > γ
L ≥ rp(B,A)2 and λ ∈
(
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ ,
1
4τ
]
. By assumption 1, the right
hand side is positive and less than 1. Define γ as the value of γ that equalizes the
two sides of the firm’s condition. γ < 12 since the right hand side is less than 1.
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Then, all firms with γ > γ strictly prefer to publish the mission statement.
For intermediate values of λ
(
λ ∈
(
max
{
1−2γL
(1−rp(B,A))4τ ,
1
4τ
}
, 1
rp(B,A)4τ
))
such that
ρ (B,B) ∈ (0, 1), the right hand side of (1.17) increases with λ. As λ → 1
rp(B,A)4τ ,
the right hand side of the inequality goes to t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)ds+(1−t¯)
´ 1
p∗∗ sg(s)ds
2
´ p∗∗
p′′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds
, which is
positive by assumption 1 and finite. For each value of λ in this range, let γλ be the
value of γ that makes the firm indifferent between publishing and not. Then, γ > γλ
implies the firm strictly prefers to publish the mission statement. γλ increases in λ
since, again, the right hand side of the firm’s condition increases with λ, implying a
higher value of γ that equalizes the two sides of the inequality.
Lemma 6b. Let assumption 1 hold. For all p∗∗ > p′′ and all λ ≥ 1
rp(B,A)4τ , there
exists a γ < 1 such that γ ∈ [γ, 1] implies the firm (weakly) prefers to publish the
mission statement.
Proof of Lemma 6b.
This follows from the proof of Lemma 6a and the fact that when ρ (B,B) = 1
the right hand side of (1.17) is t¯
´ 1
p∗∗ (1−s)g(s)ds+(1−t¯)
´ 1
p∗∗ sg(s)ds
2
´ p∗∗
p′′ (t¯−s)g(s)ds
, which is positive and
finite. 
To see that γλ weakly increases with λ note that when λ is low, γλ = γ. As λ
increases, γλ increases as shown in Lemma 6a. Then, as λ tops 1rp(B,A)4τ , γλ = γ.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7.
If
´ pα
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds + α
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)
> 0, then define γα as the
value of γ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
γα
1− γα =
´ pα
p′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ α
(
1− t¯
) (
1− 2 ´ 1
pα
sg (s) ds
)
α
(
1− t¯
) .
A firm with preferences γα is indifferent between employing policies that produce α >
0 and not. This implies that all firms with γ < γα strictly prefer the conservatism.
If the reverse inequality holds, then (1.8) is not satisfied for any γ ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 8.
If
´ pαα
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+ t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds−
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds > 0,
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then let γα be the value of γ that equalizes the two sides of (1.9). A firm with
preferences γa is indifferent between inducing conservatism of degree α and not. This
implies that all firms with γ > γα strictly prefer to induce. If
´ pαα
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds+
t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds−
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds < 0, then the right hand side of
(1.9) is negative, and all types of firm (γ ∈ [0, 1]) prefer to induce conservatism. Only
if
´ pαα
p′′
(
t¯− s
)
g (s) ds + t¯ (1− α) ´ 1
pαα
(1− s) g (s) ds −
(
1− t¯
)
α
´ 1
pαα
sg (s) ds = 0
does the right hand side grow unboundedly large, in which case no firm would
choose to induce α-conservatism.
Proof of Proposition 9.
If E [t] > E [p], then the left hand side of (1.11) is greater than 1. For any values
of β, α, and γ the right hand side of each of these equations is less than 1, satisfying
the inequalities.
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Chapter 2
Re-election of Corrupt Politicians
2.1 Introduction
In September 2002, William Braker, a member of the Hudson County Board of
Freeholders in New Jersey, was publicly implicated in an extortion scandal. He
resigned his elected office, only to rescind his resignation later in compliance with
“the wishes of his supporters...who had urged him to remain in office”.1 Two months
later he was re-elected to the Board, where he served until his conviction for taking
bribes in 2004.
This paper presents a model of corruption and re-election, and attempts to pro-
vide an explanation for why rational voters might vote for a candidate they observe
is corrupt, contributing to the persistence of such behavior in elected officials. I use
a two-period political agency model with re-election. There are two parts: a baseline
game with only rational voting and an extension with campaign activity. In both
cases, an incumbent politician (who can be good or bad) observes the outcome of a
public project and decides how to report it to the voters (i.e. whether to be truthful
about the returns or to lie and free up funds for her personal use). In the extension,
an incumbent who lies has the option to spend the funds on campaign activity in the
hopes of influencing election results. Voters then choose to re-elect the incumbent or
to oust her and elect a challenger, who may have an in-built electoral advantage over
the incumbent which is independent of his type. The campaign activity is formu-
lated in terms of campaign spending, but the overall mechanism is meant generally
to encompass any way in which a sitting politician can reduce public welfare and by
1Smothers (2002).
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doing so increase her own consumption and/or her chances of re-election.
I appeal to two explanations for voter tolerance of corruption among elected
office-holders:
1. Voters observe that all politicians are potentially corrupt and vote for the best
option available.
2. Voters observe that politics is a ‘dirty game’ and are willing to forgive a certain
amount of corruption in a politician who will serve them best in the long term.
With frequent emphasis on corruption in government (as opposed to bureaucracy), it
is unsurprising that a large section of the literature concerns politician and voter be-
havior. Starting from the ‘Leviathan hypothesis’ of Brennan and Buchanan (1980),
many authors have sought to describe the various ways in which political systems
constrain the expropriating power of the government. Myerson (1993) analyzes
several electoral systems for their efficacy in keeping corrupt parties out of power.
Besley and Case (1995) and Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that the prospect of
re-election can provide discipline, reducing the amount of public wealth extracted
by government officials. Indeed, one of the most common arguments in favor of
democracy is that it gives citizens the ability to revisit their choice of elected offi-
cial every so often to remove unsatisfactory ones. Given this political setup, and
given that voters dislike corruption, it remains something of a paradox that so many
corrupt politicians thrive, facing election after election victoriously (and oftentimes
with quite comfortable margins). It is this seeming inconsistency that is addressed
in this paper.
The puzzling re-election of corrupt officials received a significant amount of at-
tention from political scientists in the 1970s, resulting in three basic explanations.2
Firstly, that voter ignorance about corrupt acts leads them to vote for corrupt politi-
cians. Since most politicians obviously would wish to hide any corrupt dealings,
perhaps this can account for some otherwise inexplicable voter behavior. However,
this explanation does not address cases of egregious corruption which were well-
known and yet seemingly disregarded at the polls.3 Secondly, that voters will elect
corrupt politicians in exchange for favors. This explanation is unsatisfactory simply
2Rundquist et al. (1977).
3A good example is that of Rickey Peete, former Memphis, TN City Council member, who was
elected to the Council in the late 1980s, was convicted of taking bribes, and served a two-year
prison sentence. On release, he was elected again to the Council in 1995 and re-elected twice
more. He was again convicted of taking bribes in exchange for votes in 2007 and is currently
serving his sentence (Dries 2007).
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because it is unlikely that voters are being materially rewarded in sufficient numbers
to explain electoral victories. Finally, that voters implicitly trade-off corruption with
other traits, such as position on certain issues or party affiliation.
The issue was taken up in the economics literature in the 1990s, starting in
earnest with the Myerson (1993) paper. Much of this work centers on coordination
failure and preference heterogeneity as the reasons for inefficiency in democracies.4
A notable departure from the voter-side emphasis is Caselli and Morelli (2004), who
take a supply-side approach, arguing that re-election of bad (corrupt or incompetent)
politicians can be explained by a lack of good politicians willing to hold office. In
this case voters simply make the best of bad choices. A simplified variant on this
explanation will be addressed in this paper, which suggests that rational voters who
observe corruption may opt to vote for the person they see as the less corrupt of
two politicians.
One possible explanation which has not (to my knowledge) received much at-
tention in the literature is that of politics as a dirty game. Intuitively, if a certain
amount of corruption is necessary for re-election (because it garners a politician
either much-needed campaign money or the support of vote-getting groups), and
if voters realize this, they may be willing to overlook a certain amount of corrup-
tion if they believe the politician in question will ultimately serve their interests.
Politicians, counting on this forgiveness, may then decide to act corruptly to ensure
re-election, creating a vicious cycle. I also address this possibility.
I find that even good politicians will choose to act corruptly in order to secure
re-election, and that rational voters will support them in their bids to stay in office.
I also find that, in many cases, both good politicians and voters would be made
better off by eliminating the mechanism by which corruption increases re-election
chances. Only when the campaign activity provides more information to rational
voters than benefit to bad incumbents is it beneficial to leave it in place.
2.2 Related Literature
The two most closely related works are Coate and Morris (1995) and Grossman and
Helpman (2001). I follow Coate and Morris in many aspects of the baseline model
setup. They present two types of politicians—good and bad—who are charged with
the decision of implementing or not implementing a public project. The incumbent
4Besley and Coate (1998), for example.
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has private information about the public benefit of such a project, and so is in a
position to make the socially optimal choice. However, bad politicians also have ties
to a special interest, and may implement the project more often than is efficient as an
indirect transfer to that interest. I adapt their project to my setting in the following
ways. Whereas they give the incumbent the power to decide whether or not the
project goes forward, in this model the project is automatically implemented. The
only thing the politician must do is observe the outcome and decide how to report
it to the citizenry. It is here, rather than at the implementation stage, that the
incumbent can act corruptly by extracting funds from the project. Furthermore,
where Coate and Morris’s bad politician acts inefficiently via an interest group,5 the
bad politician in this model acts inefficiently in an unspecified manner (somehow
expropriating money from a successful project).
The re-election structure is also adapted from Coate and Morris. I use the tactic
of drawing challengers in the election from a known distribution, which allows an
incumbent to forward-estimate her probability of re-election after taking certain
actions, given the manner in which voters update their beliefs.6
The most important difference between the baseline model and the extension with
campaign spending relies on a feature of Grossman and Helpman’s (2001) model of
electoral competition with campaign spending.7 They break the electorate up into
two blocs: a strategic fraction, which“understand[s] the political environment and
the implications of [its] votes”,8 and an impressionable fraction, which is suscepti-
ble to campaign advertising. The vote-getting power of campaign spending is left
in reduced form.9 In Grossman and Helpman’s model, the two fractions actually
correspond to two distinct groups of voters, both of whom act according to a proba-
bilistic voting model, only differing in how they make their decisions. In this model,
there is only one voter. Therefore the two different kinds of voter correspond to two
potential types he could assume, and the composition of the electorate in Grossman
and Helpman corresponds here to the prior probability he will be realized as one or
the other. This is primarily for ease of computation, but it does have some real-world
analogues. It could, for example, be interpreted as uncertainty on the politician’s
part as to what voters will base their decisions on in the election—legislative record,
5Coate and Morris remain technically agnostic as to how exactly helping the interest group
increases the politician’s utility. However, it could happen in a number of ways. One way
which is mentioned in their paper is that the bad politician is susceptible to bribes from the
interest group (p. 1216).
6For a detailed discussion of similar models, see Besley (2006).
7Chapter 10.
8Page 321.
9Following Baron (1994).
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ethnicity, personal charm, etc.10
As an important aside, I have couched the action of this extension in terms of
campaign spending, which is most often associated with campaign advertising. The
results are therefore related to those of Prat (2002) and Coate (2004), who find that
aggregate voter welfare is improved under limits on campaign financing, even when
voters are fully rational. Coate considers directly informative campaign advertising,
in which a candidate truthfully conveys information about himself, but which may
be paid for by interest groups as a quid pro quo for more favorable policies. Prat
takes a similar policy-for-contributions scenario,11 but gives the information about
candidates’ quality to the interest group, so that voters correctly perceive candidates
who receive larger campaign contributions as higher quality. In both of their papers,
reducing or outright banning campaign advertising can improve voter welfare, even
though in both cases it provides information.
My model, like Prat’s (2002), involves campaign advertising which is indirectly
informative to rational voters in equilibrium. However, I do not mean to firmly
embed this version of the model in that context. The incumbent’s choice is meant to
stand as a metaphor for any way a politician can act that decreases public benefits
but gives her the possibility of increasing her own utility and/or her chances of
being re-elected. This is partly to highlight the supposition that politicians can
be corrupt at many points during their incumbency, not just at re-election time
when they may ‘sell’ influence to interest groups, and partly to leave in sufficient
flexibility for later extensions. To give an example, it could be that the incumbent
allows a firm to over-invoice on a public contract in exchange for kick-backs and/or
campaign contributions, but it could also be the case that she puts forward a socially
sub-optimal transportation bill which earns her the support of transport workers’
unions in the next election cycle.
The fact that the challenger automatically has funds to spend is therefore im-
portant. The origin of the funds is left unspecified, but they could represent either
a large campaign ‘war-chest’ (say from wealthy constituents) or dedicated support
from a portion of the population (perhaps for reasons of ethnicity). It is this disad-
vantage that the incumbent must decide to rectify or not.
10By way of illustration, many feel the 2004 U.S. Presidential election was decided on "moral val-
ues", as approximately 4 million evangelical Christians turned out to vote. This was unexpected
by most political observers, and probably also by the challenger, Sen. John Kerry (see Egan
(2004)).
11For an early example of the trade-off between campaign contributions and policy choices with
rational voters, see Austen-Smith (1987).
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2.3 Benchmark
2.3.1 Model
2.3.1.1 The policy
In each period a public project is automatically implemented. The social benefit
to this project, B, can be either high or low—B ∈ {H,L}, H > L > 0. The
exogenous probability that the social benefits are high is denoted β. The incumbent
observes the value of B and then decides what to report to voters. She selects an
announcement A ∈ {H,L}. If the return is low, the incumbent must report L to the
voters; she cannot pretend the outcome was better than it was. If B = H, however,
the incumbent has a choice. She can choose to report H, in which case the full
benefits of the project accrue to the voters, or she can choose to report L, in which
case the voters receive the lower value of benefits. In this way, the voters’ utility
depends only on the incumbent’s decision and the exogenous probability of a high
return β.
Reporting L when in fact B = H frees up an amount b for the incumbent’s use.
This act could represent a number of potentially corrupt activities, such as over-
invoicing for goods and services or diverting public funds for personal gain.12 The
important feature is that the incumbent can make a decision which lowers voter
utility and gives her access to funds. In this part of the model, it is assumed that
the only use for diverted funds is personal. That is, an incumbent who extracts b
from the project can only use it to increase her personal consumption.
2.3.1.2 The citizenry
There is a single representative citizen/voter who receives utility from the public
project. The voter receives uc = u (H) when the incumbent reports H, and uc =
u (L) when the incumbent reports L. u (H) > u (L). At the end of the first period,
he decides which candidate, incumbent or challenger, to vote for in the election.
12For an example see Reinikka and Svensson (2004). An alternative way of seeing the setup is that
public wealth is exogenously determined (say by tax revenue), but only the incumbent knows
how much is collected. If the public wealth is passed on to voters in the form of benefits, it
may be possible for the incumbent to expropriate some of the public wealth and pass on fewer
benefits to the citizenry.
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2.3.1.3 The politicians
There are two types of politician: good (g), and bad (b). Both types have discount
rate δ, and they receive no utility if they are not in office.13 A good politician cares
about the public benefit her announcement decision nets the citizenry. Her utility
per period is vg (A) , A ∈ {H,L}, where vg (H) > vg (L).
A bad politician, on the other hand, cares about the amount of money she can
expropriate for her personal use. Her utility is vb (b) when she lies about the project’s
return and uses all the freed-up funds herself, and vb (0) (which can be thought of as
ego-rent) either if she does not lie about the project’s return or if the return really
is low (B = L), in which case it is not possible to expropriate anything. vb (·) is
increasing in its argument, for example vb (b) > vb (0).
Note that vg (·) and vb (·) are defined on different spaces—vg on the amount of
public good provided to the voter, vb on expropriated funds from the project.
2.3.1.4 The information structure
The citizen is hampered in his decision-making by two dimensions of uncertainty.
First, he is uncertain about the actual return to the public project, as he is unable to
observeB directly. This implies a certain lack of transparency in the political system,
since I assume that the voter’s only information about the project’s outcome comes
from the incumbent politician. It is this uncertainty that enables a bad politician
to expropriate public funds for his own use, and ‘hide’ behind the possibility (as far
as the voter is concerned) of a low return to the project.
Secondly, the citizen is uncertain about the incumbent’s type. He has no direct
information on whether the incumbent is good or bad. I assume, however, that
the voter does have some, albeit imperfect, information about the incumbent prior
to the action of the game. Specifically, the voter observes a signal λi ∈ (0, 1)
that corresponds to the prior probability of the incumbent’s being ‘good’ at the
beginning of the first period. One could think of λi as the incumbent’s reputation
upon assuming office. The challenger who runs against the incumbent in the election
at the end of the first period also has a reputation, denoted λc, which is realized
after the action of the first period, right before the votes are cast. I assume that λc
13This assumption follows Maskin and Tirole (2004, p. 1035): “...it is not enough for the official
that great things be done; she wants to be the one who does them.”
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is drawn from a cumulative distribution function G (λ), which is smooth and strictly
increasing, satisfying the property G (0) = 0 and G (1) = 1.14
2.3.1.5 The game
This game is played out over two periods between the citizen and the two politicians
(incumbent and challenger). At the start of the game, Nature selects the incumbent’s
type (b or g) and the outcome of the public project (H or L). The voter receives an
imperfect signal, λi, of the incumbent’s type. The incumbent observes the outcome
B, and if B = H decides on her announcement A ∈ {H,L} and receives utility
accordingly. The citizen observes the incumbent’s announcement and receives utility
according to A. The incumbent’s record after the first period is A.
At the end of the first period, the challenger is realized. Nature determines the
challenger’s type (b or g), and the voter receives an imperfect signal of that type λc,
representing the probability he assigns to the challenger’s being good. The signal is
drawn from the cumulative distribution function G (λ). The voter uses λi, λc, and
the incumbent’s first-period record to decide which candidate to elect. The winner
of the election takes office in the second period, observes the outcome of the new
public project, and makes her reporting decision. Payoffs are realized, and the game
ends here.
The incumbent has two relevant decisions to make that comprise her strategy.
First, her strategy must specify for each type of incumbent what to report in the
first period in the event B = H. Second, the strategy must specify for each type
her reporting decision in the second period following re-election.
The challenger’s strategy has only one component—a rule specifying his reporting
decision in the event he is elected and B = H. This will depend only on his type,
since the game ends after he is called on to act.
The voter’s strategy is a rule specifying the probability of re-electing the incum-
bent given the incumbent’s record A, her initial reputation li, and the challenger’s
initial reputation lc. The citizen’s strategy will depend on his beliefs about the
incumbent’s type. These beliefs are determined by the incumbent’s reputation and
her record at the end of the first period.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A PBE of this game
14This structure of voter information is the same as in Coate and Morris (1995).
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will consist of a strategy for the incumbent, a strategy for the challenger, beliefs for
the citizen, and a strategy for the citizen. The citizen’s beliefs must be consistent.
That is, for every action the incumbent takes with positive probability, the citizen
derives his beliefs on the incumbent’s type using Bayes’ rule. Furthermore, all
strategies must be optimal given the strategies (and possibly beliefs) of the other
players.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
In this section I solve for the equilibrium of the game laid out above. Equilibrium
is solved for by backward induction.
2.3.2.1 Second period behavior of politicians
An incumbent who is re-elected to office in the second period will act depending
on her type. If she is good, she will report A = H when the return to the project
is high since vg (H) > vg (L). When it is low she can only report truthfully. Her
second-period expected utility is ∆vg ≡ βvg (H) + (1− β) vg (L). A bad incumbent,
on the other hand, will expropriate as much as possible from the project, reporting
A = L no matter what. His second-period expected utility will therefore be ∆vb ≡
βvb (b) + (1− β) vb (0). If the challenger is elected at the end of period one, he will
follow the same strategy as the incumbent——tell the truth if good, lie if bad.
2.3.2.2 Citizen’s voting behavior
The citizen always prefers to have a good politician in office in the second period
(compare uc = βu (H) + (1− β)u (L) with a good politician to uc = u (L) with
a bad one). Therefore, he will vote for the candidate he believes is most likely to
be good given the information available to him. Let λ (A) denote the voter’s best
estimate (from Bayes’ rule) of the probability the incumbent is good when A is her
record. Given a challenger with reputation λc, the citizen will choose to re-elect the
incumbent if and only if λ (A) > λc. Recall that the challenger’s initial reputation is
drawn from the cumulative distribution function G (λ). Therefore, the probability
of an incumbent’s being re-elected is given by G (λ (A)).
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2.3.2.3 First period behavior of incumbent and citizen’s beliefs
The only time the incumbent has to make a decision about her report is when
B = H. It is therefore necessary to specify strategies for good and bad incumbents
only in this event. Consider the following payoffs:
Vg (H) = vg (H) + δG (λ (H)) ∆vg (2.1)
Vg (L) = vg (L) + δG (λ (L)) ∆vg (2.2)
Vb (H) = vb (0) + δG (λ (H)) ∆vb (2.3)
Vb (L) = vb (b) + δG (λ (L)) ∆vb (2.4)
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) give the expected total payoff of a good incumbent who
reports H and L, respectively. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) give the expected total
payoff of a bad incumbent who reports H and L, respectively.
Clearly the strategy for the incumbent that maximizes her expected payoff de-
pends on the citizen’s beliefs. On the equilibrium path, the citizen’s beliefs must
be determined using Bayes’ rule. Off the equilibrium path, after first-period ac-
tions that occur with zero probability in equilibrium, the citizen’s beliefs are not
tied down. As a result, there exist equilibria which depend on unreasonable out-
of-equilibrium beliefs. For example, there is a set of equilibria where both types lie
about the return to the project, and their actions are supported by beliefs that any
incumbent who tells the truth must be very unlikely to be a good type. I address
the issue by focusing on equilibria that satisfy a kind of monotonicity in beliefs.15 I
will say that the voter’s beliefs satisfy this monotonicity property if λ (H) ≥ λ (L).
What this means is that a voter cannot attribute a lower probability of being good
to an incumbent who reports H than to one who reports L. This follows Coate and
Morris (1995), and so will use their terminology, denoting this an equilibrium with
monotonic beliefs (EMB).
Knowing that the citizen updates his beliefs in this manner, the incumbent
chooses a first-period strategy that maximizes her expected payoff. I will call any un-
truthful reporting ‘corruption’ (i.e. a politician is corrupt if she reports A = L when
the project return is high). It should be noted here that in the interests of clarity I
will focus on fully separating EMBs only. There is a set of semi-separating equilibria
(depending on parameter values) which do not add to overall understanding of the
15This will become a focus on equilibria satisfying lexicographic monotonicity of beliefs in the
extension in 2.4.
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model’s implications, and so will not be considered here.
2.3.3 Results
The first result states that in equilibrium there is always some corruption.16
Lemma 1. There is no equilibrium in which both types of incumbent behave
honestly.
Lemma 1 establishes that universal honesty is never an equilibrium. The bad
incumbent always has an incentive to deviate from the pooled strategies given the
voter’s beliefs. It remains to be seen that it is possible for at least one type of
incumbent to behave honestly in equilibrium. Let {Ag, Ab} be a pair of strategies,
where the first object is the good type’s strategy and the second object the bad
type’s.
Proposition 1. {H,L} is an EMB of the benchmark model for all λi that satisfy
G
(
λi (1− β)
λi (1− β) + (1− λi)
)
≥ 1− vb (b)− vb (0)
δ∆vb
.
Note that, unlike in traditional signaling games,17 there is no discipline effect
on first-period behavior of the bad type. Even though she is looking forward to re-
election, which requires voters to attach a high probability to her being a good type,
she is unrestrained in her actions in the first period. This is due to the uncertainty
the voter has over the outcome of the public project. If the incumbent’s initial
reputation is high enough, a bad incumbent can ‘hide’ behind the possibility (from
the voter’s perspective) that she is a good incumbent who had the bad luck of being
in office when the project return was low.
An important feature of this equilibrium is that it is an equilibrium with honesty,
in which good types do not lie/steal from the public (though bad types do).
16Omitted proofs are in the appendix.
17A classic example is Maskin and Tirole (2004).
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2.4 Campaign Spending
2.4.1 Model
2.4.1.1 The Policy
In this extension, there are no changes in the mechanics of the public project. The
incumbent still chooses how to report the outcome of a high-return project. The
only change is that now, if the incumbent reports A = L when in fact B = H, freeing
up the amount b, she has the opportunity to spend that money on either personal
consumption or on campaign-related activities or a combination of the two.
2.4.1.2 The Citizenry
Now, the citizen will be one of two types. With probability σ, the voter will be
strategic. That is, he will be exactly like the voter in 2.3.1.2, observing the incum-
bent’s actions (including her announcement and her level of campaign spending)
and updating his beliefs via Bayes’ rule. A strategic voter cares only about the
types of the politicians. With probability 1 − σ, he will be impressionable. His
vote is susceptible to campaign activity in that he will vote for whichever candidate
spends the most money in the campaign. The voter’s type is realized just before
the election is held, so that before that time it is unknown to all players.18
2.4.1.3 The Politicians
The politicians remain largely unchanged. Good types receive utility from the bene-
fits their decisions render the citizenry, bad types from expropriated funds. Now, the
challenger is realized at the end of period one with both an initial reputation λc and
an amount of money available for campaign spending cc. cc is assumed to be drawn
randomly from a distribution H(c), which is smooth and increasing, with H (0) = 0.
This endowment of campaign funds does not contribute to either politician’s utility,
except indirectly via its effect on re-election probability.
I make the following assumption on the good incumbent’s utility, which states
18This is not crucial—what matters is that the voter cannot credibly signal to the incumbent what
type he is, so that the incumbent makes her decision with some uncertainty as to which type
of voter she will face.
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that the benefits of being in office in the second period outweigh the present costs
of lying to the voter.
Assumption 1. vg (H)− vg (L) < δ∆vg
2.4.1.4 The Game
Timing remains the same as in 2.3.1.5. The incumbent’s strategy now specifies
an announcement A and an amount of campaign spending ci ∈ [0, b]. Her record
now consists of (A, ci). A strategic voter forms the belief λ (A, ci), and votes for
the incumbent with probability G (λ (A, ci)). Impressionable voters vote for the
incumbent if ci > cc, which occurs with probability H (ci). This makes the total
probability of re-election σG (λ (A, ci)) + (1− σ)H (ci).
2.4.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this part is also solved for by backward induction. Second period
actions are the same. A strategic voter forms beliefs based on the incumbent’s initial
reputation and first period record and votes accordingly. An impressionable voter
observes campaign spending and votes accordingly. It remains only to determine
the incumbent’s first period strategy.
Again in the interests of eliminating unnatural voter beliefs (and subsequently
the unreasonable equilibria supported by them), I will focus on a slightly different
class of equilibria than in the benchmark. Here, I will say that the citizen’s beliefs
satisfy ‘lexicographic monotonicity’ if the following properties are satisfied: first,
it must be that λ (H, ·) ≥ λ (L, ·), which is essentially the same idea as in the
benchmark—namely that an incumbent who reports high must be thought as least
as good as an incumbent who reports low. Secondly, given a low report, it must be
that λ (L, x) ≥ λ (L, y) if x > y > 0. This says that, if money is being spent in the
campaign, a voter cannot believe an incumbent less likely to be good if she spends
more money in the campaign (and hence less on her own personal consumption).
This eliminates equilibria that require the good incumbent to throw money away
if the voter believes that spending all of b in the campaign is the mark of a bad
type. Equilibria satisfying this property will be called equilibria with lexicographic
monotonic beliefs (ELMB).
It is immediately apparent that a good incumbent will only take the actions (H, 0)
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or (L, b) in equilibrium, meaning that she will either report a high return truthfully,
or if she opts to lie she will spend all the funds on her campaign. A bad incumbent,
on the other hand, chooses campaign spending ci to maximize
vb (b− ci) + δ (σ · 0 + (1− σ)H (ci))Dvb
(taking into account that λ (L, ci) = 0 for all ci that separate her from a good type),
which yields c∗ satisfying
h (c∗) = v
′
b (b− c∗)
δ (1− σ)Dvb . (2.5)
With the following assumptions on the bad type’s preferences, I can characterize
the equilibria of this game.
Assumption 2a. vb (b)− vb (b− c∗) ≤ δ (1− σ)H (c∗) ∆vb
Assumption 2b. vb (b− c∗)− vb (0) ≥ δ [σ + (1− σ) (H (b)−H (c∗))] ∆vb
Taken together, Assumptions 2a and 2b mean that a bad incumbent finds it
worthwhile to forgo some immediate consumption to increase her re-election chances,
but not worthwhile to forgo all immediate consumption. These are restrictions on
the parameters that yield the equilibrium results of interest. One further assumption
ensures that all probabilities are between 0 and 1.
Assumption 3. vb (b)− vb (b− c∗) ≥ δ [(1− σ)H (c∗)− σ] ∆vb
Intuitively Assumption 3 says that the difference in re-election probability be-
tween spending c∗ to win the impressionable voters and convincing the strategic
voters cannot be too large.
2.4.3 Results
Let {(Ag, cg) , (Ab, cb)} be a pair of strategies, where the first object is the good
type’s strategy and the second object the bad type’s.
Proposition 2. There are four fully-separating ELMBs of this game. They fall
into two classes:
1. Equilibria with honesty: {(H, 0) , (L, 0)} and {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}, both supported
by out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ (L, c) = 0 for all c > 0.
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2. Equilibria without honesty: {(L, b) , (L, 0)} and {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}, both sup-
ported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ (L, c) = 0 for c ∈ (0, b).
In equilibria with honesty, a good incumbent will always report a high return truth-
fully, and a bad type will always lie, either taking all the funds for personal use or
spending some on campaign activities. In equilibria without honesty, both types
take money from the project. The good type uses it all in her campaign; the bad
type either takes all of it for herself, or takes some and uses some in the campaign.
Result 1. In both classes of equilibrium (that is, regardless of what a good type
does), the bad incumbent’s strategy depends only on her initial reputation. Specif-
ically, the bad incumbent’s strategy is
1. (L, 0) for all λi ≥ λ(L,0) where λ(L,0) ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
G
 λ(L,0) (1− β)
λ(L,0) (1− β) +
(
1− λ(L,0)
)
 = 1− σ
σ
H (c∗)− vb (b)− vb (b− c
∗)
σδ∆vb
(2.6)
2. (L, c∗) for all λi ≤ λ(L,c∗) where λ(L,c∗) ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
G
(
λ(L,c∗)
)
= 1− σ
σ
H (c∗)− vb (b)− vb (b− c
∗)
σδ∆vb
. (2.7)
The first case occurs when the incumbent’s initial reputation is high enough that
a bad type will rely on the strategic voter having a high enough posterior belief
following a low report to compensate for not spending any money in the campaign,
similar to the benchmark model. The second case occurs when her initial reputation
is low enough that it becomes worth it for the bad incumbent to forgo unrestrained
consumption in the first period to increase her chance of re-election by winning over
the impressionable voter.19
Result 2. Which class of equilibrium arises depends on the relationship between
the good type’s preferences and the voter composition. In particular, it depends on
the direction of inequality of the following expression:
vg (H)− vg (L)
σδ∆vg
R 1− σ
σ
H (b) . (2.8)
19Note that λ(L,c∗) < λ(L,0), which means there are intermediate values of λi for which no sepa-
rating ELMB exists.
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Informally, if the left hand side is greater than the right hand side, then it is not
worthwhile for a good incumbent to steal from the public project in the first period
to increase her chances of re-election.20 If the right hand side is greater, meaning she
is sufficiently more likely to encounter an impressionable voter than a strategic one,
the opposite is true, and even a good incumbent will steal money from the public
project in order to ensure she is re-elected.
2.5 Discussion
The results laid out above seem to suggest a possible explanation for the re-election
of visibly corrupt public officials. If a strategic voter cares about getting a good
politician into office, then he will vote for a politician who steals from him if he
observes that she acted in the interests of being re-elected to do good in the future.
Knowing this, a good politician may be willing to trade off her present desire to
pass on high returns to the public against the competing desire to be in office in the
future. While the strategic voter might wish that the good politician did not steal
from him in the first period, it would be imprudent of him to eject a politician he
knows to be good in favor of a challenger who is of unknown type.
Looking again at equation (2.8), notice that the left hand side is the normalized
benefit of truth-telling for the good incumbent. This is the relationship between the
utility lost by stealing from the public project in the first period and the discounted
utility of being in office in the second period. Let this ratio be called her ‘preferences’.
The right hand side is then the increased probability of re-election achieved by
spending b. For simplicity throughout the rest of the discussion, let us takeH(b) = 1.
That is, an incumbent who spends b in the campaign is sure to win the impressionable
voter.
As shown in Figure 2.1 on page 74, for any given voter composition (any σ), there
are some good politicians who value re-election highly enough to make it worthwhile
for them to act corruptly in the first period. In this case, the strategic voter sees
the incumbent as the proverbial lesser of two evils—not ideal, but better than the
alternative (a challenger who may be a bad type). This is loosely in line with
Caselli and Morelli (2004) in that voters might prefer a politician with preferences
that induce her to act honestly, but none may be available. If that is the case, they
will vote for the dishonest one who at least seeks to serve their interests in the long
20Note that if Assumption 1 is violated, then this is always true, and a good type will never be
dishonest in the first period.
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term.
Alternatively, the same figure illustrates that, for any given set of preferences,21
there is a voter composition that will induce a good incumbent to act corruptly in the
first period. This is the case of politics as a dirty game, where there is a good chance
that the election is decided not on merit, but on other factors (money or influence),
and any incumbent wishing to be re-elected must play by the rules. The voter may
prefer that the incumbent doesn’t steal from the project, and the incumbent herself
may be reluctant to do so (vg (H) > vg (L)), but as long as she values re-election at
least slightly, she can be induced to act dishonestly. The strategic voter will still
support her.
Consider now the bad incumbent, who always lies. The first period now involves a
more complicated trade-off between consumption and re-election. For her, the pres-
ence of the impressionable voter provides a perverse kind of discipline, in as much as
she now sometimes forgoes maximal consumption in the first period. However, this
discipline does not benefit society, since it goes to winning over the impressionable
voter with campaign spending.
2.5.1 A Note on Welfare
I turn now to the question of policy. If it were possible to do away with the means of
influencing impressionable voters, would society be better off? In order to make this
comparison, I need an assumption on the behavior of impressionable voters when
campaign spending is disallowed. Say that they flip a coin and vote with probability
1
2 for the incumbent and with probability
1
2 for the challenger.
Consider first the baseline model. The expression for the citizen’s expected utility
before the first period action (given that λi is such that we have {H,L} as an
equilibrium)22 is somewhat cumbersome and becomes much easier to work with if
I make some simplifying assumptions. Take voter utility u(H) = 1, u(L) = 0, and
G as the standard uniform distribution (λc ∼ U [0, 1]). The general expression and
the simplified version are provided in full in the appendix.
Making the same simplifications, the citizen’s expected utility in the four equilib-
21Provided they satisfy Assumption 2.
22In the presence of impressionable voters who randomize when indifferent, the condition for
{H,L} as an equilibrium is G
(
λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi)
)
≥ 1− vb(b)−vb(0)δσ∆vb , so that any time {H,L} is an
equilibrium of the game without impressionable voters, it is also an equilibrium of the game
with impressionable voters.
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ria of the extended model—{(H, 0) , (L, 0)}, {(L, b) , (L, 0)}, {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}, {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}—
is also given in the appendix.
It is straightforward to see that E
[
UH,L
]
≥ E
[
U (H,0),(L,0)
]
if and only if λi ≥ 13−β .
So if the incumbent has a good enough reputation, the voter is better off if campaign
spending is banned. Otherwise, if the incumbent has a bad reputation, welfare is
improved by letting the incumbent lose to the (expected average quality) incumbent
on spending.23
What if it is impossible to ban the campaign activity? Since a good incumbent
has a better chance of getting re-elected if she spends b in the campaign than she
does if she simply passes that amount on to the voter, it might be feasible that voter
welfare is higher when the good incumbent steals from the public project, provided
she uses it to get re-elected. However, that turns out not to be the case. Comparing
{(H, 0) , (L, 0)} with {(L, b) , (L, 0)} and {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)} with {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}, the
voter always prefers a good politician to act honestly with regards to the returns to
the public project.24
Comparing {(H, 0) , (L, 0)} to {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}, it is necessary to say something
about H (c∗). E
[
U (H,0),(L,c
∗)
]
is minimal when H (c∗) = 1. So I will consider that
scenario, and if it is the case that voters are better off when the bad incumbent
reveals himself when he is guaranteed to win the impressionable vote, it is also the
case if he might be beaten by the challenger. Some algebra yields E
[
U (H,0),(L,c
∗)
]
≥
E
[
U (H,0),(L,0)
]
↔ σ ≥ λi(1−β)+(1−λi)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi)+λ2i (1−β)
.
If the voter is sufficiently likely to be strategic (and hence able to expel an incum-
bent who is revealed to be bad), then voters would like for bad incumbents to reveal
themselves. However, recall from (2.7) that higher values of σ mean it is less likely
that a bad incumbent is willing to reveal himself, instead preferring to masquerade
as an unlucky good incumbent.
To give an example, for β = 12 , if λ =
2
5 , E
[
U (H,0),(L,0)
]
≥ E
[
UH,L
]
so voters prefer
campaign activity not be banned. Then, if σ ≥ 0.9, voters would prefer the bad type
to reveal himself through spending a positive amount less than b on the campaign.
However, if σ = 0.9 then (under the simplifying assumptions above) λ(L,c∗) < 19 , so
23If in the absence of any campaign spending the impressionable voter votes for the incumbent (a
sort of incumbency advantage), then welfare is higher under no campaign spending if λ ≥ 12 =
E [λc].
24The condition for voter welfare to be higher when the good politician acts corruptly is δ > 2β(1−σ) ,
so voters have to value future payoffs extremely highly in order to be willing to trade present
payoff for future honesty.
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the bad incumbent would not find any campaign spending worthwhile—she would
rather lose the impressionable voter in order to consume more in the present and
hide behind the possibility of project failure in the reputation comparison with
the challenger. Note that these results are highly dependent on the simplifying
assumptions made above, and it may be the case that campaign spending is more
attractive under alternative parameter and distributional assumptions.
To summarize, a sufficiently high reputation for the incumbent means that cam-
paign spending is undesirable. In almost all cases, voter welfare would be higher if
it were possible to ban the campaign activity and let the strategic voter determine
the outcome of the election based on his assessment of the candidates’ types. This is
in line with much of the campaign finance literature. It is only if the incumbent has
a bad reputation that voter welfare is improved by letting the challenger defeat the
bad incumbent on spending. Voters never want good politicians to ransack public
funds to finance campaigns, but they may want bad incumbents to reveal themselves
through their spending patterns, in which case leaving open the option of campaign
spending may be optimal.
2.5.2 Further Inquiry
There are a number of avenues of further inquiry indicated by the results of this
paper. If voters strongly prefer a candidate of their political or ethnic affiliation,
or if they feel very strongly about a particular policy issue, might they be more
eager to admit some corruption in order to have their preferred candidate in of-
fice? The policy space is very limited here, with management of the public project
the only responsibility of the incumbent. As such, this paper does not address
the possibility that voters trade-off between their policy preferences (or perhaps
personal characteristics such as ethnicity) and corruption. Adding parties, multi-
dimensional policy/corruption space, or ethnicity could therefore add some realism
to the model.
In addition to adding the aforementioned characteristics to flesh out the political
space, there are a number of unsatisfactory elements to this model, which further
extension may address. Firstly, the challenger is little more than a straw man in this
set-up. He takes no action, does nothing specific to earn his reputation, and cannot
account for his campaign funds. This last criticism, while very much intended in
the case of this model to introduce an in-built advantage over the incumbent, is the
most troubling. Why one candidate should have access to funds or electoral support
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and not another should be made explicit in a model that tries to explain election
results.
2.6 Conclusion
I have proposed an explanation for the re-election of corrupt politicians, namely
that if good politicians can count on rational voters’ recognizing them as such and
supporting them in elections, they may in some circumstances be induced to behave
corruptly in pursuit of re-election. This result is counter-intuitive, especially consid-
ering the theoretical and empirical emphasis on the disciplining effect of re-election.
I do not attempt to account for cases in which re-election motives provide discipline,
but rather for the many puzzling cases in which corrupt incumbents are re-elected,
sometimes by large margins.
The results of this paper suggest two mechanisms whereby this may happen.
Firstly, if voters perceive that all politicians are potentially corrupt, they have no
choice but to elect the corrupt politician whom they believe will best serve their
interests in the long run. Secondly, if some corruption is necessary for re-election, and
if politicians like staying in office, then they can be induced to behave dishonestly,
correctly perceiving that rational voters will support them anyway.
These results also suggest some instances in which it may be better for voters to
leave the mechanism for corrupt campaign activity in place. If the voter composition
is such that an incumbent is very likely to face a strategic voter on election day,
then it may be preferable to risk a bad incumbent’s re-election if it allows strategic
voters to eject the bad types more frequently. Furthermore, if voters place a higher
weight on future consumption than present consumption, they may prefer that a
good incumbent uses whatever means are at her disposal to get re-elected, even if
it means stealing from them.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Good incumbent’s trade-off
The figure shows the good incumbent’s trade-off between ‘preferences’ vg(H)−vg(L)
δ∆vg
and re-election. For a given set of preferences, there is a small enough σ to make a
good incumbent play (L, b). For a given voter composition (σ), there are incumbent
preferences that lead to the choice of (L, b) in the first period.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. If both types of incumbent behave honestly when the project
return is high, that is, A = H for both types, then the citizen cannot distinguish
them from their records. His posterior must equal his prior
λ (H) = λ (L) = λi.
A bad incumbent expects payoff vb (0) + δG (λi) ∆vb if she reports truthfully upon
observing a high return. If she were to lie, that is report A = L, she would expect
to receive vb (b) + δG (λi) ∆vb, which is greater. The bad type, therefore, has a
profitable deviation from her postulated strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the specified equilibrium strategies, the citizen’s
beliefs calculated from Bayes’ rule are
λ (H) = 1
λ (L) = λi (1− β)
λi (1− β) + (1− λi) .
A good incumbent expects payoff vg (H) + δ∆vg given these beliefs. If she were to
deviate and lie, she would expect vg (L) + δG
(
λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi)
)
∆vg, which is lower.
She will not deviate. A bad incumbent expects payoff vb (b)+δG
(
λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi)
)
∆vb
from her equilibrium strategy. If she were to deviate and truthfully report the high
return, she would get vb (0) + δ∆vb, which is less than her equilibrium payoff for all
λi that satisfy the condition specified.25 
Proof of Proposition 2.
It is obvious that a good incumbent will only play the pure strategies (H, 0) or
(L, b) in ELMB. Therefore these are the only strategies that need to be considered
for the good type. A bad type will never pool with a good type in equilibrium,
the proof of which is the same as that of Proposition 1. Since we are looking at
fully separating ELMBs we therefore only need to consider the potential equilibria
{(H, 0) , (L, 0)}; {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}; {(L, b) , (L, 0)}; and {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}, since a bad
type will either take all the money for personal use, or if she spends some, she will
optimize her spending according to equation (2.5).
25A sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is vb (b)− vb (0) ≤ δ∆vb.
75
The payoffs set down in equations (2.1) to (2.4) now become
Vg (H, 0) = vg (H) + δσG (λ (H, 0)) ∆vg
Vg (L, b) = vg (L) + δ [σG (λ (L, b)) + (1− σ)H (b)] ∆vg
Vb (L, c) = vb (b− c) + δ [σG (λ (L, c)) + (1− σ)H (c)] ∆vb
Vb (L, 0) = vb (b) + δσG (λ (L, 0)) ∆vb
1. {(H, 0) , (L, 0)}
This strategy pair results in the beliefs λ (H, 0) = 1, λ (L, 0) = λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi) ;
λ (L, c) ∈ [0, 1] for c 6= 0.
First consider a good type. Given these beliefs, the payoffs above, and Assump-
tion 2b, a good type will not deviate to (L, b) for any beliefs λ (L, b) ∈ [0, 1]
provided vg (H)−vg (L) ≥ δ (1− σ)H (b) ∆vg, which follows from Assumption
2.
Now consider a bad type. This equilibrium is supported by out of equilib-
rium beliefs λ (L, c) = 0 for c 6= 0. If a bad incumbent spends money in
the campaign, she will spend c∗ as defined in (2.5). The condition for a
bad type’s not wanting to deviate to (H, 0) or (L, c∗) is G
(
λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi)
)
≥
1−σ
σ
H (c∗)− vb(b)−vb(b−c∗)
σδ∆vb . The second condition holds for all λi ≥ λ(L,0), where
λ(L,0) is defined as in (2.6), and is between 0 and 1 by Assumptions 2a and 3.
If these conditions are satisfied, then {(H, 0) , (L, 0)}is an ELMB.
2. {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}
This strategy pair results in the beliefs λ (H, 0) = 1, λ (L, c∗) = 0, λ (L, 0) = λi,
λ (L, c) ∈ [0, 1] for c /∈ {0, c∗}.
Given these beliefs, the payoffs above, and Assumption 2b, the condition for
the good type’s not wanting to deviate to (L, b) is the same as in part 1 above.
Regarding a bad type, this equilibrium is supported by out of equilibrium
beliefs λ (L, c) = 0 for c /∈ {0, c∗}. A bad type will not deviate to any other
spending amount c by the definition of c∗as optimal. The condition for a bad
type’s never wanting to deviate to (H, 0) or (L, 0) is G (λi) ≤ 1−σσ H (c∗) −
vb(b)−vb(b−c∗)
σδ∆vb . The second condition holds for all λi ≤ λ(L,c∗), where λ(L,c∗)is
defined as in (2.7) and is between 0 and 1 by Assumptions 2a and 3. If these
conditions are satisfied, then {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)} is an ELMB.
3. {(L, b) , (L, 0)}
This strategy pair results in the beliefs λ (L, b) = 1, λ (L, 0) = λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi) ,
λ (H, 0) = 1, and λ (L, c) ∈ [0, 1] for c /∈ {0, b}. Note that λ (H, 0) is pinned
down by lexicographic monotonicity. Since λ (L, c) is not pinned down for
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c /∈ {0, b}, let λ (L, c) = 0 for those parameter values.
Given these beliefs, the payoffs above, and Assumption 2b, the condition for a
good type’s not wanting to deviate to (H, 0) is vg (H)−vg (L) ≤ δ (1− σ)H (b) ∆vg.
If a bad type spends money in the campaign, she will spend c∗ as defined in
equation (2.5). The condition for a bad type’s not wanting to deviate to (H, 0),
(L, b), or (L, c∗) is the same as in part 1. The second condition holds for all
λi ≥ λ(L,0). If these conditions are satisfied, then {(L, b) , (L, 0)} is an ELMB.
4. {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}
This strategy pair results in beliefs λ (L, b) = 1, λ (L, c∗) = 0, λ (L, 0) = λi,
λ (H, 0) = 1, and λ (L, c) ∈ [0, 1] for c /∈ {0, c∗, b}. Again, note that λ (H, 0) is
pinned down by lexicographic monotonicity. Since λ (l, c) is not pinned down
for c /∈ {0, c∗, b}, let λ (L, c) = 0 for those values.
Given these beliefs, the payoffs above, and Assumption 2b, the condition for
a good type’s not wanting to deviate to (H, 0) is the same as in part 3. A bad
type will not deviate to any other spending amount c ∈ [0, b) by the definition
of a maximum. The condition for a bad type’s not wanting to deviate to
(H, 0), (L, b), or (L, 0) is the same as in part 2. The second condition holds
for all λi ≤ λ(L,c∗). If these conditions are satisfied, then {(L, b) , (L, c∗)} is an
ELMB.
Proof of Result 1.
1. Consider parts 1 and 3 from the proof of the claim above. If λi ≥ λ(L,0), then
regardless of the strategy of a good incumbent, a deviation from (L, 0) is not
worthwhile.
2. Consider parts 2 and 4 from the proof of the claim above. If λi ≤ λ(L,c∗), then
regardless of the strategy of a good incumbent, a deviation from (L, c∗) is not
worthwhile.
Proof of Result 2.
From the proof of Claim 1, it is clear that the good type’s strategy, independent
of what a bad type plays, only depends on the direction of inequality of equation
(2.8).
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A note on welfare
Baseline model:
E
[
UH,L
]
= λiβ [u (H) + δσ (βu (H) + (1− β)u (L))]
+λiβ
1
2δ (1− σ) (βu (H) + (1− β)u (L))
+λiβ
1
2δ (1− σ)
(
βλ¯u (H) +
(
1− βλ¯
)
u (L)
)
+λi (1− β) [u (L) + δσ (G (λ (L)) (βu (H) + (1− β)u (L)))]
+λi (1− β) δσ (1−G (λ (L)))
(
βλ˜u (H) +
(
1− βλ˜
)
u (L)
)
+λi (1− β) δ (1− σ) 12 (βu (H) + (1− β)u (L))
+λi (1− β) δ (1− σ) 12
(
βλ¯u (H) +
(
1− βλ¯
)
u (L)
)
+ (1− λi) [u (L) + δσG (λ (L)) (βu (H) + (1− β)u (L))]
+ (1− λi) δσ (1−G (λ (L)))
(
βλ˜u (H) +
(
1− βλ˜
)
u (L)
)
+ (1− λi) δ (1− σ)
[1
2u (L) +
1
2
(
βλ¯u (H) +
(
1− βλ¯
)
u (L)
)]
where λ¯ = E [λc] and λ˜ ≡ E [λc | λc > λ (L)].
Under the simplifying assumptions u(H) = 1, u(L) = 0, and G as the standard
uniform distribution (λc ∼ U [0, 1]), the citizen’s expected utility becomes
E
[
UH,L
]
= λiβ
[
1 + δσβ + δ (1− σ) β 34
]
+λi (1− β)
[
δσβλ (L) + δσβ (1− λ (L)) 1 + λ (L)2 + δ (1− σ) β
3
4
]
+ (1− λi)
[
δσβ (1− λ (L)) 1 + λ (L)2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
4
]
where λ (L) = λi(1−β)
λi(1−β)+(1−λi) .
Extended model:
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1. {(H, 0) , (L, 0)}
E
[
U (H,0),(L,0)
]
= λiβ
[
1 + δσβ + δ (1− σ) β 12
]
+λi (1− β)
[
δσβλ (L, 0) + δσβ (1− λ (L, 0)) 1 + λ (L, 0)2
]
+λi (1− β) δ (1− σ) β 12
+ (1− λi)
[
δσβ (1− λ (L, 0)) 1 + λ (L, 0)2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
2. {(L, b) , (L, 0)}
E
[
U (L,b),(L,0)
]
= λiβ [δβ]
+λi (1− β)
[
δσβλ (L, 0) + δσβ (1− λ (L, 0)) 1 + λ (L, 0)2
]
+λi (1− β) 12δ (1− σ) β
+ (1− λi)
[
δσβ (1− λ (L, 0)) 1 + λ (L, 0)2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
3. {(H, 0) , (L, c∗)}
E
[
U (H,0),(L,c
∗)
]
= λiβ
[
1 + δσβ + δ (1− σ) β 12
]
+λi (1− β)
[
δσβλi + δσβ (1− λi) 1 + λi2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
+ (1− λi) β
[
δσβ
1
2 + δ (1− σ) β (1−H (c
∗)) 12
]
+ (1− λi) (1− β)
[
δσβ (1− λi) 1 + λi2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
4. {(L, b) , (L, c∗)}
E
[
U (L,b),(L,c
∗)
]
= λiβ [δβ]
+λi (1− β)
[
δσβλi + δσβ (1− λi) 1 + λi2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
+ (1− λi) β
[
δσβ
1
2 + δ (1− σ) β (1−H (c
∗)) 12
]
+ (1− λi) (1− β)
[
δσβ (1− λi) 1 + λi2 + δ (1− σ) β
1
2
]
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Chapter 3
Overconfidence in Group Decision-Making
3.1 Introduction
Models of information aggregation generally assume agreement among committee
members about the distribution of information within the group. All strategic be-
havior takes place within the context of a known distribution (or known expected
distribution) of relevant information. Overconfidence can undermine this agreement.
If I think I am incredibly knowledgeable about the subject to be decided, and act
accordingly, but my partner believes me to be wholly uninformed (and also acts ac-
cordingly), our voting behavior will depart from standard predictions. We may also
fail to aggregate our information efficiently. This paper is concerned with strategic
responses to overconfidence, and with institutional remedies to it.
I model a three-person committee which must decide on a policy. The members
agree on which policy is best given the state of the world, but have differing ability
to assess the state. In particular, one of the committee members is completely unin-
formed (receives a pure noise signal) but believes that his signal is as informative as
that of his best-informed colleague. This causes him to vote informatively (following
his signal) when he should ignore his signal and vote to make better-informed agents
pivotal.
The other two members of the committee know about the first agent’s biased
belief, and must respond to it in their voting strategy. I show that under majority
rule the effect of overconfidence in an uninformed committee member is to cause
the middle-informed member to ignore her signal. In trying to make the most
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informed agent pivotal, she discards her information. Given these voting strategies,
overconfidence results in trading better information for worse, and causes a loss
of social welfare. I then show that alternative voting rules can mitigate the loss
associated with overconfidence. When the uninformed member suffers from biased
beliefs about his ability, at least one of the unanimity rules does strictly better
than majority rule to aggregate information. Indeed, the voting rule which requires
unanimity to enact the a priori most likely policy becomes highest-ranked, which
represents a reversal of preferences from the non-biased baseline.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper takes for granted that agents in committees vote strategically, taking into
account the information contained in other voters’ strategies. It therefore follows
the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Following their contribution,
there is a body of work on optimal voting rules given strategic behavior by individ-
uals in group decision-making.1 Even with identical preferences,2 voting rules can
be important for achieving socially optimal outcomes. Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998) show that unanimity requirements on juries result in a higher probability of
error than simple majority rule, since a single juror’s private information may not
be convincing in the event she is pivotal.
When there is asymmetric information on a committee, strategic voting must
take this heterogeneity into account as well. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)
demonstrate that less well-informed voters may strictly prefer to abstain to avoid
adding noise to the decision process.3 I do not allow for abstention, but something
of its flavor remains in the uninformed player’s decision to vote in such a way that
guarantees that better-informed agents decide the outcome.
In this paper I analyze strategic voting behavior in a committee when there is
heterogeneity in information quality and the least-informed agent is overconfident
about his ability. Overconfidence was first discussed in the psychological literature,
1See, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998, 1999), McLennan (1998) and Cough-
lan (2000). There is a large literature on optimal voting rules with endogenous information
acquisition which is not relevant to this paper. See, for example, Persico (2004), Gerardi and
Yariv (2008), or Gershkov and Szentes (2009). Levy (2007) explores optimal voting rules in an
adverse selection setting.
2Visser and Swank (2007) find the optimal voting rule when committee members have divergent
preferences.
3Battaglini et al. 2010 provide experimental evidence in support of Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s
model.
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but there is also a substantial economic literature on overconfidence, particularly in
individual decision-making. Odean (2004) reviews much of the literature on over-
confidence among traders, and tests empirically whether a certain type of investor
trades excessively due to overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) find
evidence of overconfidence in CEO investment and acquisition decisions. Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) experimentally test the relationship between personal overcon-
fidence and business entry mistakes. In this literature, overconfidence is usually
modeled as a boundedly rational assessment of one’s likelihood of success (either
by overestimating one’s ability or underestimating the challenges posed by one’s
environment).
More specifically, I consider a particular type of overconfidence similar to the
Dunning-Kruger effect (after the psychologists who experimentally identified it).
The Dunning-Kruger effect disproportionately affects low-ability individuals, and
makes them overestimate their ability both in absolute terms and relative to the rest
of the population (Kruger and Dunning 1999). Their interpretation is that the same
skills that produce good performance are necessary to evaluate good performance,
so there is a meta-cognitive gap that renders low-skilled individuals simultaneously
incompetent and unaware of their incompetence. Further studies have found such
an effect in various circumstances: college debate teams and hunters tested on their
knowledge of firearms (Ehrlinger et al. 2003),4 medical lab technicians tested on
knowledge of relevant terminology and problem solving (Haun et al. 2000), and
medical residents evaluating their interview skills (Hodges et al. 2001). When I
assume that the uninformed committee member has an incorrect belief about his
ability, I have in mind something like this effect.
It should be noted that although overconfidence is most often thought of in terms
of bounded rationality, there are many researchers who argue that there is nothing
irrational about it. Benoit and Dubra (2009), taking issue with prevailing explana-
tions of the ‘better than average effect’ whereby a (possibly large) majority of people
consider their skills better than average, argue that it is fully compatible with ratio-
nality for a majority of the population to regard themselves as ‘above average’. This
seemingly impossible state of affairs arises because of rational updating based on
random realizations (e.g. drivers who happen not to have an accident will reasonably
surmise they are likely to be good drivers, even though only a small minority of all
drivers—skilled or not—actually have an accident in a given period of time). Krajč
and Ortmann (2008) make a similar argument that the Dunning-Kruger effect is due
4The effect was evident in this paper even when subjects were monetarily incentivized to assess
their performance accurately.
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to inference based on biased information rather than a meta-cognitive impairment
among low-ability individuals.5 Both of these arguments contend that overconfi-
dence is more properly described as an inference or signal-extraction problem than
as a failure of rationality. Notably, they do not quibble with the existence of the
phenomenon, merely its source. As I am interested in the effects of overconfidence
on group decision-making rather than its psychological or micro-foundational roots,
I remain agnostic on that point.
3.3 Model
In this section I introduce the basic elements of the model, along with an extension
to account for overestimation of ability in uninformed agents.
3.3.1 Benchmark model
There are two states of the world, 0 and 1, whereW = {0, 1} denotes the set of states
with generic element w. A 3-member committee {A,B,C} must make a decision
about which policy to implement, where the policy space is D = {0, 1} with generic
element d. All committee members have identical preferences over the decision:
u(d, w) =
1 d = w0 d 6= w.
At the beginning of the game, nature chooses a state of the world w ∈ W . All
agents know that the probability of state 1 being realized is q, where q > 12 . Each
committee member I then receives a signal sI ∈ {0, 1}, which contains private infor-
mation about the true state of the world. The signals are conditionally independent,
and members differ in the accuracy of their signals. Pr (sI = w | w) = i. Agent A
receives an uninformative signal
(
a = 12
)
. Agents B and C, however, receive infor-
mative signals 12 < b < q < c. Note that B is informed
(
b > 12
)
, but her signal is less
accurate than the prior belief on the state of the world, whereas C is more accurate.
To start with, I assume that all of the above information is common knowledge.
After observing his signal, each agent lodges a vote vI ∈ {0, 1}. Agents are not
allowed to abstain, but they are not required to vote in a way that reflects their
5See also Krueger and Mueller (2002) and Burson et al. (2006).
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private information. The outcome d is determined by majority rule (MR), and I
focus on the case where agents vote as if they are pivotal.
3.3.2 Model with overconfidence
Next I consider the case in which agent A suffers from overconfidence. Whilst
the true accuracy of his signal is a = 12 , he believes his signal is accurate with
probability aˆ = c. That is, though his signal is in reality uninformative, he believes
it is as informative as the signal of the best-informed member of the committee. To
keep things relatively simple, I will allow for common knowledge of disagreement
about the quality of A’s information. A will consider himself well-informed, but
will accurately perceive the quality of the other members’ information. B and
C will correctly perceive all signal qualities, and that A overestimates his signal
accuracy. A knows that B and C think he is uninformed, and that they will be
acting accordingly; he simply disagrees with them.
This disagreement deserves some justification, since it departs from standard
rationality in a pretty significant way. Firstly, common knowledge of A’s overconfi-
dence is the most conservative assumption I could make here, since it involves the
smallest departure from full recognition of reality. If A believed instead that B
and C were also bullish about his ability, the effects I analyze would be reinforced.
Secondly, note that disagreement is compatible with Bayesian rationality since the
agents do not share a common prior about the accuracy of A’s signal. I therefore
do not fall foul of Aumann (1976), which shows that with common priors players
cannot ‘agree to disagree’.
By way of example, it could be that B and C are more experienced, and there-
fore able to accurately pinpoint their own abilities and that of others, whereas A,
being less experienced, overestimates his knowledge. This can happen on medical
teams with both recent medical school graduates and experienced doctors. The re-
cent graduates, lacking experience, may not be able to judge which of competing
diagnoses is more likely, whereas more senior team members can discount unlikely
possibilities and reach a more reasonable conclusion.6 The parallels with my model-
ing assumptions are as follows: senior doctors correctly estimate the likelihood that
they come to the correct diagnosis, and they also know how likely new graduates
are to be correct. New graduates, on the other hand, accurately perceive that se-
nior doctors are often correct, but think that their classroom training, which is of
6Thanks to Dr. Jake Young for this example.
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more recent vintage than that of senior doctors, gives them better real-world diag-
nostic ability than it does. They think that senior doctors incorrectly underweight
textbook knowledge relative to experience.7
3.3.3 Strategies and beliefs
Each agent chooses an action vI ∈ {0, 1}. Define the set of actions v = {vA, vB, vC}.
All agents seek to maximize expected utility
U =
∑
w∈{0,1}
Pr (w) Pr (d = w | w, v) .
Given that agents’ incentives are aligned, they vote for whichever state of the world
is more likely given their beliefs stemming from the prior q and their private signals,
and conditional on being pivotal. Agents assess this likelihood using Bayes’ Rule.
It will be convenient to refer to a transformation of the various probabilities above
when going through the results. Define lq ≡ ln q1−q , and similarly, for i ∈ {a, b, c}
define li = ln i1−i . Using these transformations, I can represent beliefs additively.
For example, if A always votes 1 regardless of his signal, and C votes sincerely (that
is, vC = sC), and B is pivotal, then it must be that sC = 0. Say sB = 0. By Bayes’
Rule,
Pr (w = 0 | q, sB = 0, sC = 0) = (1− q) bc(1− q) bc+ q (1− b) (1− c)
so that the posterior likelihood ratio is
L ≡ ln
[
Pr (w = 0 | q, sB = 0, sC = 0)
Pr (w = 1 | q, sB = 0, sC = 0)
]
= ln
[
(1− q) bc
q (1− b) (1− c)
]
= −lq + lb + lc > 0
meaning that Pr (w = 0 | q, sB = 0, sC = 0) > 12 and B should vote 0.
3.4 Majority Rule
I limit attention to equilibria in pure strategies. Details can be found in the ap-
pendix.
7Other papers that make similar assumptions are Gervais and Goldstein (2007), Blanes i Vidal
and Möller (2007), and Morris (1996).
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3.4.1 Benchmark model
In the basic model, there are two relevant parameter regions, where the parameter
of interest is q (or rather, lq). Throughout the analysis, I assume that the difference
in ability between B and C is ‘large enough’:8
Assumption 1 : lb < 12 lc
3.4.1.1 lq ∈ [lb, lc − lb)
Here, there are two equivalent equilibria.9 The equilibria, given in the form (vA, vB, vC)
are:
1. (1, 0, sC) with U = c
2. (0, 1, sC) with U = c
Player A correctly perceives himself as being uninformed, and therefore ignores his
signal. Player B’s two sources of information, her signal and the prior, are both
inaccurate enough that she would prefer to ignore her signal and vote in such a way
that makes C, the best-informed agent, pivotal.
3.4.1.2 lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc]
Here, there is a single pure strategy equilibrium.
1. (1, sB, sC) with U = (1− q) bc+ q (1− (1− b) (1− c))
Again, player A knows that his signal is uninformative, so when voting as if pivotal
he casts a vote for the more likely state according to the prior. Now, however, player
B, though knowing her information is not as accurate as C’s, can vote informatively.
This is because the prior is strong enough that when B is pivotal (i.e. C has received
sC = 0), if B has received sB = 1, that information plus the prior is sufficient to
outweigh C ′s signal.
8All of the main results go through with the weaker assumption that c−b(c+b)(1−c) >
2b−1
2−b . Making
the simpler assumption allows me to focus on a particular case for completeness of exposition.
It essentially requires some minimal heterogeneity in ability on the committee. For example, if
b = .6, this assumption requires c ≥ .692. The weaker assumption requires c ≥ .661.
9There is also a third, mixed-strategy equilibrium which I will not discuss here.
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3.4.2 Overconfidence model
Consider the range of values of q (lq). The action is in whether B thinks she ought
to play her signal once A believes his signal is informative (aˆ = c).
3.4.2.1 lq ∈ [lb, lc]
Now, there is a single equilibrium.
1. (sA, 1, sC) with U = 12 (c+ q)
A’s overconfidence leads him to vote according to his signal, which the other players
recognize as uninformative. In essence, A is injecting noise into the voting process.
B’s best response is to ignore her signal and vote 1. She cannot distinguish between
the two events (sA = 1, sC = 0) and (sA = 0, sC = 1) both of which leave her pivotal.
She therefore compares her signal to the prior and, as her signal is less accurate than
the prior, votes 1 regardless of her private information.
The consequences of this are noteworthy. When lq < lc − lb, B was already
ignoring her signal, so the effect of A’s overconfidence is simply to add noise to the
outcome. C is no longer always pivotal, which results in a loss because he is the
best-informed. The expected loss is 12 (c− q).
When lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc], the effect is to trade B’s information for A’s. Whereas
B would have voted informatively, contributing the information contained in her
signal when A correctly perceived his ability, she ceases to vote informatively when
he is overconfident. She strategically counteracts A’s uninformed voting by lodg-
ing a vote for the a priori more likely state of the world. The expected loss is(
b− 12
)
(c (1− q) + q (1− c)).
3.5 Other voting rules
The loss generated by A’s overconfidence can therefore be substantial. In this sec-
tion, I explore whether the choice of voting rule can mitigate this loss. Up to now, I
have assumed that decision is by majority rule, but other rules can also be applied.
Specifically, there are two unanimity rules that might be implemented in this com-
mittee, and it is possible that the loss associated with these other rules might be
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less than that associated with majority rule.
Let x ∈ {1, 2, 3} be the number of votes required to enact policy 1. Then x = 1
corresponds to a unanimity requirement for 0 (U0), x = 2 is again majority rule
(MR), and x = 3 is a unanimity requirement for 1(U1). I covered majority rule in
section 3.4. In this section I will cover equilibrium voting behavior under the other
two voting rules.
3.5.1 0-Unanimity (U0, x = 1)
A similar pattern of results to those under majority rule arises here. Consider the
same partition of the parameter space.
3.5.1.1 lq ∈ [lb, lc − lb)
1. The basic model involves equilibrium strategies (0, 0, sC) with U = c.
When there is no bias, A and B ignore their private information and vote in
such a way to ensure that the best-informed member, C, is pivotal.
2. The overconfidence model has strategies (sA, 0, sC), with expected utility U =
1
2 (c+ q). The expected loss is again
1
2 (c− q), the same as under majority
rule.
3.5.1.2 lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc]
1. In the basic model, the equilibrium is (0, sB, sC) with expected utility U =
(1− q) bc+ q (1− (1− b) (1− c)).
2. Under the model with overconfidence, the equilibrium is (sA, sB, sC), with
expected utility U = (1− q) 12bc + q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)
and expected loss
1
2 [(1− q) bc− q (1− b) (1− c)].
Here, unlike the case of x = 2 (majority rule), when A votes informatively, B votes
informatively as well. This is due to the greater uncertainty when the voting rule
is majoritarian as opposed to unanimous. Under majority rule, B cannot tell the
difference between the pivotal events (sA = 1, sC = 0) and (sA = 0, sC = 1), so she is
left to compare her own information with the (more accurate) prior, and disregards
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her signal. Under U0, however, B is pivotal only if C has received a 0-signal. In this
case, when the prior information is accurate enough that agreement between sB and
the prior outweigh sC , B can vote informatively. The loss due to A’s bias here is
smaller than under majority rule, so that U0 is preferable to MR if overconfidence
is expected.
3.5.2 1-Unanimity (U1, x = 3)
For all lq ∈ [lb, lc], there is only one equilibrium regardless of the presence of overcon-
fidence. The unique equilibrium under U1 is (1, 1, sC), with expected utility U = c.
Here, A’s bias is insufficient to induce him to follow his private signal. A and B
always vote such that C is pivotal.
3.5.3 Optimal voting rules
In this section, I identify the optimal voting rules for different values of the prior
q. Implicitly, this requires that the committee (or the social planner in charge of
setting the committee’s rules) can observe the prior before setting the voting rule.10
In the next section I will consider the alternative case, in which a ‘constitution’ must
be written which cements a voting rule before the prior is realized.
As seen in the last two sections, for every value of q and every voting rule, with
and without bias, either there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium or the multiple
pure strategy equilibria produce the same expected utility. It is therefore possible
to rank the voting rules. These rankings are contained in following propositions.
Proposition 1 : When A is unbiased (correctly perceives that a = 12 ), the following
ranking obtains:
1. lq ∈ [lb, lc − lb) implies that U0∼MR∼U1
2. lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc] implies that U0∼MRU1
Proposition 2 : When A is overconfident (aˆ = c), there exists q∗ ∈ (lc − lb, lc) such
that the following ranking obtains:
10As B and C would agree on preferences over voting rule, pairwise majority rule would select
the optimal voting rule. Obviously, other voting rules would produce different results, but such
meta-voting procedures are beyond the scope of this paper.
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1. lq ∈ [lb, lc − lb) implies that U1U0∼MR
2. lq ∈ [lc − lb, lq∗) implies that U1U0MR
3. lq ∈ [lq∗ , lc] implies that U0U1MR
The presence of overconfidence in the uninformed member of the committee results
in some noteworthy reversals of preferences regarding voting rules. Specifically,
majority rule is always weakly top-ranked when there is no bias, but once there is
bias it becomes weakly bottom-ranked.11 Also, when lq ∈ [lc − lb, lq∗ ] 1-unanimity
goes from strictly bottom-ranked to strictly top-ranked. For low and intermediate
levels of the prior, it is optimal to choose a rule that is not vulnerable to A’s bias,
as A votes uninformatively under U1 to make C pivotal. This can mean losing the
information contained in B’s private signal, which is why U1 is weakly dominated
by the other voting rules in the absence of bias. However, when policy 1 becomes
more likely, it is better to choose the voting rule most biased in favor of 1, even
though it means the voting outcome will be affected by uninformed voting by A.
Then, both informed agents vote informatively.
To summarize, when the voting rule is decided with full information about the
strength of the prior, the optimal voting rule depends on q. For low and intermediate
levels of q, U1 is optimal. This voting rule is biased against 1, which is a priori more
likely, but it prevents A from voting according to his uninformative signal, making
C’s information decisive. For high enough q, however, it becomes worthwhile to
tolerate A’s voting informatively in order to use both B’s and C’s information, so
U0 (which is biased in favor of 1) becomes the optimal voting rule.
3.5.4 Optimal constitution
Occasionally voting rules must be set before any information is available, including
any public information in the form of the prior. The problem then is to write a
constitution, which specifies a universal voting rule that does not depend on any
degree of confidence about the right decision. If the voting rule must be set before the
prior is realized, the presence of overconfidence results in a reversal of preferences.
Assume that q ∼ U [b, c]. When this is the only information available to the
11This is due to the uncertainty over which state of the world B is in when she is pivotal. Commu-
nication between her and C prior to voting might rehabilitate MR as the optimal voting rule.
Since B and C have aligned incentives, they can share information, and they would prefer a
voting rule that makes the pair of them decisive.
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constitution writer, the optimal ex ante voting rule is summarized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 3 : When A is unbiased, the optimal constitution specifies either U0
or MR. The ranking is U0∼MRU1.
Because 1 is most likely
(
q > 12
)
, in the absence of bias the constitution writer
would never choose the voting rule which is biased against the most likely outcome.
Given the strategies of the players, expected payoffs are equal between U0 and
MR.
Proposition 4 : When A is overconfident, the optimal constitution specifies U1.
The ranking is U1U0MR.
The presence of bias makes 1-unanimity more attractive than the other voting
rules, because under U1 A doesn’t use his private information. The information of B
is not used either, but this is preferable to the case in which A votes his (uninformed)
signal whether or not B votes hers.
3.6 Conclusion
What I have shown is that, on a sufficiently heterogeneous committee, overconfi-
dence in an uninformed member can cause a better-informed member to strate-
gically discard her information, resulting in a social loss. This loss is most pro-
nounced under majority rule, so that when overconfidence is an issue, unanimity
rule is preferable. Indeed, when the voting rule must be set before any information
is revealed, 1-unanimity becomes the most preferred constitutional voting rule. It
is least-preferred when there is no overconfidence.
The dramatic reversals of preferences are due to the fact that agents cannot share
their information with each other prior to voting. If B and C could discuss their
signals, they could jointly determine the outcome under majority rule, which would
resurrect majority rule as preferred. Therefore, the results presented here are most
applicable to committees whose members know each others’ identities but do not
know what votes have been cast or what information other agents are working with
at the time they make their voting decisions.
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Appendix
Equilibrium
For each player I, each state of the world w, and each voting rule x, it is possible
to calculate
Pr (w = 1 | pivx, sI , v)
where pivx =
∑
s−I∈{0,1}2 Pr (s−I) Pr (piv | s−I , x, v) and v is the conjectured equilib-
rium strategy. Then, each player votes for policy 1 if and only if
Pr (w = 1 | pivx, sI , v) > 12 .
Alternatively, let LI (x, sI , v) be the as-if-pivotal likelihood ratio for voting rule
x and conjectured strategies v given signal sI .
LI (x, sI , v) = ln
Pr (w = 1 | pivx, sI , v)
Pr (w = 0 | pivx, sI , v)
Player I votes for policy 1 if and only if
LI (x, sI , v) > 0.
Majority rule
First consider the benchmark case, where A knows that a = 12 .
1. lq ∈ [lb, lc − lb):
a) First I show that there is no equilibrium in which all three follow their
signals (sA, sB, sC). Suppose vA = sA and vC = sC . In particular, I will
show that B does not want to follow a signal sB = 0.
LB (2, 0, (sA, ·, sC)) = ln Pr (w = 1 | piv2, 0, v)Pr (w = 0 | piv2, 0, v)
= ln
q
(
1
2c+
1
2 (1− c)
)
(1− b)
(1− q)
(
1
2c+
1
2 (1− c)
)
b
= lq − lb
> 0
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So upon receiving sB = 0, B votes 1.
b) Next I show that there is no equilibrium in which two players follow
their signals. I show the results for putative equilibria in which the non-
responsive player plays 1; results are similar for those in which they play
0.
i. (sA, sB, 1) C has a profitable deviation.
LC (2, 0, (sA, sB, ·)) = ln Pr (w = 1 | piv2, 0, v)Pr (w = 0 | piv2, 0, v)
= ln
q
(
1
2b+
1
2 (1− b)
)
(1− c)
(1− q)
(
1
2b+
1
2 (1− b)
)
c
= lq − lc
< 0
So upon receiving sC = 0, C votes 0.
ii. (sA, 1, sC) A has a profitable deviation.
LA (2, 1, (·, 1, sC)) = ln Pr (w = 1 | piv2, 1, v)Pr (w = 0 | piv2, 1, v)
= ln
q (1− c) 12
(1− q) c12
= lq − lc
< 0
So upon receiving sA = 1, A votes 0.
iii. (1, sB, sC) B has a profitable deviation.
LB (2, 1, (1, ·, sC)) = ln Pr (w = 1 | piv2, 1, v)Pr (w = 0 | piv2, 1, v)
= ln q (1− c) b(1− q) c (1− b)
= lq − lc + lb
< 0
So upon receiving sB = 1, B votes 0.
c) Finally I show that in the only equilibrium, only player C follows his
signal. The results are similar if the non-responsive players’ strategies
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are reversed.
i. (sA, 1, 0) C has a profitable deviation.
LC (2, 1, (sA, 1, ·)) = ln q
1
2c
(1− q) 12 (1− c)
= lq + lc
> 0
So upon receiving sC = 1, C votes 1.
ii. (1, sB, 0) C has a profitable deviation.
LC (2, 1, (1, sB, ·)) = ln q (1− b) c(1− q) b (1− c)
= lq − lb + lc
> 0
So upon receiving sC = 1, C votes 1.
iii. (1, 0, sC) No player has a deviation.
LA (2, 0, (·, 0, sC)) = ln qc
1
2
(1− q) (1− c) 12
= lq + lc
> 0
So A has no deviation.
LB (2, 1, (1, ·, sC)) = ln q (1− c) b(1− q) c (1− b)
= lq − lc + lb
< 0
So B has no deviation.
LC (2, 1, (1, 0, ·)) = ln qc(1− q) (1− c)
= lq + lc
> 0
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LC (2, 0, (1, 0, ·)) = ln q (1− c)(1− q) c
= lq − lc
< 0
So C has no deviation. There is also an equivalent equilibrium
(0, 1, sC).
2. lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc]
I will show that the equilibrium given in the text is indeed an equilibrium.
Showing its uniqueness proceeds as above, but is omitted for brevity.
LA (2, 0, (·, sB, sC)) = ln q (b (1− c) + (1− b) c)
1
2
(1− q) (b (1− c) + (1− b) c) 12
= lq
> 0
So A has no deviation.
LB (2, 1, (1, ·, sC)) = ln q (1− c) b(1− q) c (1− b)
= lq − lc + lb
> 0
LB (2, 0, (1, ·, sC)) = ln q (1− c) (1− b)(1− q) cb
= lq − lc − lb
< 0
So B has no deviation.
LC (2, 1, (1, sB, ·)) = ln q (1− b) c(1− q) b (1− c)
= lq − lb + lc
> 0
LC (2, 0, (1, sB, ·)) = ln q (1− b) (1− c)(1− q) bc
= lq − lb − lc
< 0
So C has no deviation.
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Now suppose that A is overconfident, so that aˆ = c. Again, I will show that the equi-
librium provided in the text is indeed an equilibrium. Uniqueness is demonstrated
as in part 1 above.
1. lq ∈ [lb, lc]
LA (2, 1, (·, 1, sC)) = ln q (1− c) aˆ(1− q) c (1− aˆ)
= lq − lc + laˆ
> 0
LA (2, 0, (·, 1, sC)) = ln q (1− c) (1− aˆ)(1− q) caˆ
= lq − lc − laˆ
< 0
So A has no deviation.
LB (2, 0, (sA, ·, sC)) = ln
q
(
1
2c+
1
2 (1− c)
)
(1− b)
(1− q)
(
1
2c+
1
2 (1− c)
)
b
= lq − lb
> 0
So B has no deviation.
LA (2, 1, (sA, 1, ·)) = ln q
1
2c
(1− q) 12 (1− c)
= lq + lc
> 0
LA (2, 0, (sA, 1, ·)) = ln q
1
2 (1− c)
(1− q) 12c
= lq − lc
< 0
So C has no deviation.
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0-Unanimity and 1-Unanimity
The same type of analysis yields the results in the text.
In summary, the strategies and expected payoffs are given in the following ta-
bles.
Table 3.1: Benchmark model strategies and payoffs
lq∈ [lb, lc − lb)
U0 MR U1
strategy (0, 0, sC) (1, 0, sC)/(0, 1, sC) (1, 1, sC)
exp. utility c c c
lq∈ [lc − lb, lc]
U0 MR U1
strategy (0, sB, sC) (1, sB, sC) (1, 1, sC)
exp. utility (1− q) bc+ q (1− (1− b) (1− c)) see U0 c
Table 3.2: Overconfidence model strategies and payoffs
lq∈ [lb, lc − lb)
U0 MR U1
strategy (sA, 0, sC) (sA, 1, sC) (1, 1, sC)
exp. utility 12 (c+ q)
1
2 (c+ q) c
lq∈ [lc − lb, lc]
U0 MR U1
strategy (sA, sB, sC) (sA, 1, sC) (1, 1, sC)
exp. utility (1− q) 12bc+ q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)
1
2 (c+ q) c
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 : Follows from comparison of the payoffs in Table 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 2 : Follows from comparison of the payoffs in Table 3.2.
(1− q) 12bc+q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)
> 12 (c+ q) for all q >
c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) , so U0MR.
Clearly, c > 12 (c+ q), so U1MR.
It remains to show when U1U0 for lq ∈ [lc − lb, lc].
(1− q) 12bc+ q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)
≤ c
q + qb (1− c) ≤ c+ (1− q) (1− b) c
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The left hand side increases in q and the right hand side decreases in q. When
q = c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) , the inequality simplifies to
1− b ≤ b
which is true. When q = c, the inequality simplifies to
b ≤ 1− b
which is false. Therefore by continuity there exists a q∗ ∈
[
c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) , c
]
such that
U1∼U0. For all q < q∗, U1U0; for all q > q∗, U0U1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 : Consider the payoffs in Table 3.1. Clearly, expected
utility is equal for all possible voting rules at low levels of q. For {q | lq ≥ lc − lb},
(1− q) bc + q (1− (1− b) (1− c)) > c. This implies that U0 and MR are preferred
to U1 for high levels of q. Therefore, a constitution writer is indifferent between U0
and MR, and prefers either of these to U1.
Proof of Proposition 4 : Consider the payoffs in Table 3.2. Clearly, c > 12 (c+ q),
so U1MR for all q. Also, (1− q) 12bc + q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)
> 12 (c+ q) for all
q > c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) , so U0MR. It remains to show that U1U0.
Let t = c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) (i.e. q | lq = lc − lb). The ex ante expected utility from U1
is ˆ c
b
c
1
c− b dq
The ex ante expected utility from U0 is
ˆ t
b
1
2 (c+ q)
1
c− b dq +
ˆ c
t
[1
2 (1− q) bc+ q
(
1− 12 (1− b) (1− c)
)] 1
c− b dq.
U1U0 requires U (U1) > U (U0), which gives (after integrating and some manip-
ulation)
(c− t) 2c (2− b) + 2c (t− b) > (c− t) (c+ t) (1 + b+ c− 2bc)
+ (t+ b) (t− b)
(c− t)2 (1 + b+ c− 2bc) + 2c (t− b) > (c− t) 2c (1− c) (2b− 1)
+ (t+ b) (t− b)
(c− t)2 (1 + b+ c− 2bc) + 2 (c− t) (t− b) + (t− b)2 > (c− t) 2c (1− c) (2b− 1) .
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Because t = c(1−b)
c(1−b)+b(1−c) ,
(c− t)2 (1 + b+ c− 2bc) + 2 (c− t) (t− b) + (t− b)2 > (c− t)2 2 (c (1− b) + b (1− c))
2 (c− t) (t− b) + (t− b)2 + b (c− t)2 > (c− t)2 (1− c) (2b− 1) .
Since b < 1, b > 2b− 1, which gives the result.
So U1U0 if the constitution must be written before q is realized.
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